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Every year, thousands of refugees are forced to leave their countries of origin and are hosted by 
their neighboring countries. However, very little is known about the impact of these refugees on 
the  local  economy  and  its  inhabitants.  Based  on  hypothesis  formulated  during  a  two-month 
iterative ﬁeld research, a theoretical framework is used to understand how the refugee inﬂow 
would affect the good and labour markets of the local economy. We then test the theoretical 
predictions  regarding  the  potential  winners  and  losers  among  the  refugee-hosting  population, 
using  household  panel  data  collected  in  the  region  of  Kagera  in  Tanzania.  Our  identiﬁcation 
strategy exploits both time and spatial variations in the way households traced between 1991 and 
2004 have been affected by the refugee inﬂows originating from Burundi (1993) and Rwanda 
(1994). Our results show that local hosts do not necessarily suffer from the refugee presence. Net 
economic  beneﬁts  could  even  emerge  provided  a  sufficient  mass  of  refugees  is  gathered. 
Furthermore, the economic beneﬁts appear to be unevenly distributed among the refugee-hosting 
population. Agricultural workers are likely to suffer the most from an increase in competition on 
the  labor  markets  and  the  surging  prices  of  several  goods.  On  the  contrary,  non-agricultural 
workers and self-employed farmers are in a better position to beneﬁt from such a refugee inﬂow. 
We also conjecture that the welfare deterioration experienced by those involved into business 
could  be  explained  a  selection  effect  resulting  from  the  reported  entry  of  larger-scale 
entrepreneurs from other regions. 
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This paper presents research results of the Belgian Program on Interuniversity Poles of Attraction initiated by 
the  Belgian  State,  Prime  Minister's  Office,  Science  Policy  Programming.  The  scientific  responsibility  is 
assumed by the authors.  1 Introduction
Every year, thousands of people are forced to leave their countries in a desperate
attempt to nd a safe heaven, their life being threatened by civil conicts. End of
2007, UNHCR (2007) reported 11.4 million refugees in the world, whose 2.2 million
originated from Sub-Saharan Africa. Contrary to some popular ideas, these refugees
do not invade the industrialized world but are in widespread majority, hosted by
their neighboring countries. Media and host governments have often pressured the
international community to help them in supporting the burden induced by this
massive inow of refugees. However, very little is known about the exact nature
of the impact of the refugees on the local hosts. From a policy point of view, the
United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) seems increasingly aware
that the issue of the impact of the refugees on their local hosts has been overlooked
for too long. For example, in Tanzania, the UN agency for refugees is implementing
a new program easing the transition phase following the closure of all camps in the
region of Kagera. 1 A better understanding of the main channels through which the
local population is aected by massive refugee inows would help in improving the
eciency of such programs.
Our collective memory tends to perceive refugee camps as an unorganized mass
of temporary tents and occupied by passive refugees under assistance. Nevertheless,
this common view is far from many experiences. First, some temporary situations
can end up by lasting sometimes very long. This has resulted in what UNHCR
has called the problem of protracted refugee situations (Crisp, 2003; Slaughter and
Crisp, 2009). City-sized refugee camps have mushroomed in often very poor areas,
where inhabitants themselves struggle to make a living. Despite their traumatic
experiences and their poor health conditions when they arrived, still these refugees
came in with productive capacities, even with some assets (human capital, live-
stock, etc) or at least, keep networks to get access to these assets (de Montclos and
Kagwanja, 2000; Werker, 2007). Therefore, refugees are likely to endorse some im-
portant economic functions and have signicant impacts on their hosts' livelihoods.
The purpose of this paper is to contribute to a better understanding of the long-
term impact of refugees on the local communities. We combine eldwork collected
information and the very comprehensive Kagera and Health Development Survey to
identify how the local population has been aected by the refugee inows originating
from Burundi (1993) and Rwanda (1994) in the region of Kagera (North-Western
Tanzania).
The issue of the impact of a refugee settlement on local economies does not seem
1In June 2008, the Lukole camp (Ngara district) was the last camp of the region of Kagera to
be closed making the Kagera region free of refugees for the rst time since about 15 years.
1to have attracted very much research interest. As far as we know, Chambers (1986)
in an article entitled \Hidden Losers? The impact of rural refugees and refugee
programs on poorer hosts" is the rst to have paid attention to this issue. Based on
scattered evidence and rural experiences, this author argues that the presence of a
refugee camp has mixed consequences for the host population through an increase
in price, wage competition and competition for natural resources. The better-o
and more visible hosts would be more likely to gain from the presence of refugees
and refugee programs while by contrast, poorest hosts could loose from competition
for food, work, wages, services and common property resources. He points to these
vulnerable hosts as the hidden losers. Since then, authors such as Kuhlman (2002),
Whitaker (1999), Landau (2004) and several papers from the UNHCR s Evaluation
and Policy Analysis Unit have provided eld-work support of this contrasted impact.
Unfortunately, the state of knowledge is not much more advanced than the \scattered
evidence" on which Chambers (1986) bases his analysis. As summarized by Whitaker
(1999, 2), \refugees are assumed to have a dierent impact on diverses classes,
genders, sectors and regions within the host country, but little empirical evidence
has been done on this issue."
Few economists seem to have paid attention to this subject or at least, related
ones. Some authors such as Hatton and Williamson (2004) focus on the causes
that lead refugees to seek asylum in developed countries and in particular, in the
European Union. They also study its impact on native-born workers. In a cross-
country setting, Azam and Hoeer (2002) also test empirically the factors explaining
the number of refugees per country of origin. Stark (2004) formalises the dynamic
process that distinguishes a refugee ow from an immigration move while Bubb
et al. (2007) theoretically study the system of refugee protection based on the 1951
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees as a Pareto-improving contract that
bound states to provide a more ecient level of the global good of protection. The
issue of eciency of food aid which is also related to the subject has also been
much studied. Its impact on prices and trade have been explored by notably Barret
(2002), Dercon and Krishnan (2004), and Donovan et al. (2006).2 Nevertheless,
those subjects are much more general than the presence of refugees, per se.
As far as we know, two papers are much closer to ours, at least in studying
2Our paper is also related to studies assessing the impact of migrants on local labour markets
(Card, 1990; Hunt, 1992; Ottaviano and Peri, 2006; Borjas, 1999, for a review). However, our
approach diers from these wage-type equation analysis in the sense that we seek to undertake
a broader assessment of the impact of refugee inows on the welfare of the local population, not
restricted to labour employment. It indeed appears from observations made on the eld that refugees
along with the aid provided by the international community have had very wide impacts on the
economic structures of the region of Kagera.
2related issues in the Tanzanian context. Based on two dierent sets of data, Alix-
Garcia and Saah (2008) assess the impact of the proximity to a refugee camp through
changes in agricultural prices between 1995 and 1998. They also test the impact
of massive refugee inows on the holding of assets. Two important results might
be emphasised. On the one hand, they found a signicant increase in the prices of
some agricultural goods (bananas, beans and milk) and a decrease in the price of
the aid-delivered good (maize). On the other hand, they found a positive impact
on the acquisition of more valuable assets. Based on a richer dataset encompassing
information on consumption, income and other household characteristics, our paper
provides a complementary - general equilibrium inspired - piece of evidence. While
our paper focuses on the dierentiated impact on the welfare of the local population
via their occupations, our identication also diers in the scale of the phenomenon.
AlixGarcia and Saah (2008) use a nation-wide survey, where proximity to the refugee
camps has a dierent meaning than ours. While about 13% and 6% of their house-
holds are located in wards within respectively 200 and 100 kilometers of the closest
refugee camps, all and 96% of our sample are located within the same radius. To
achieve similar percentages, our households need to be located between 10 and 30
kilometers. 3 Given the reported eects (see section 2.2) and the high transport
costs in the region, we have some good reasons to believe that the impacts of the
refugee camps are highly localized. We are also concerned that an excessively large
scale of analysis will capture unobserved and time-variant regional eects. Another
related paper is the one by Baez (2007) who assesses the short and long run eects
of hosting refugees on health conditions of children. The author oers evidence of
adverse impacts, almost 1.5 years after the shock, on children's health. In addition
to the dierences of specication dictated by the nature of the research question, our
paper diers in the denition of the refugee presence. While Baez district distinction
faces measurement errors (see footnote 18 of this paper) and the use of the distance
to the Rwandan border may capture refugee-unrelated factors such as the eects of
warfare in this neighboring country, our measure of the refugee presence, based on
both proximity to and the size of the refugee camps provides a better source of local
variation among the surveyed households.
This paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we will describe our case
study and list a series of hypothesized eects that have been collected through our
3Similarly, the closest market used by AlixGarcia and Saah (2008) to assess the eect on prices
in the region of Kagera is the one of Bukoba. This small town is located at, at least, 70 kilometers
from a small refugee camp and at best, at 145 kilometers (or 4 hours by bus) from the rst refugee
camp hosting more than 10,000 refugees. There is no doubt that Bukoba is one of the least aected
location in our sample.
3eldwork. 4 Section 3 introduces a theoretical framework aiming at identifying who
are likely to gain or suer the most from the changes induced by the refugee inows.
Section 4 presents the empirical results of our study and discuss the robustness of
these results. Finally, we will conclude in section 5.
2 Refugee inows in Kagera
2.1 Context
The Kagera region is a very remote region in North-Western Tanzania. The region is
impacted between the Victoria Lake, Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi. Kagera is one
of the poorest regions of the country in terms of income per capita with an average
of 149,828 Tanzanian Shillings (Tzs, i.e. 166$ a year) per habitant (NBS, 2003).
In 2002, about 2 million people lived in a region of 29,241 squared kilometers and
mainly rely on subsistence agriculture. One particularity of this region results from
its recent history of refugee hosting that makes it an extraordinary \laboratory" to
study the impact of refugee inows on the local population. On the one hand, the
magnitude of the phenomenon is a case in point. From October 21, 1993, between
250,000 and 300,000 Burundians ed into Tanzania following the assassination of the
President of Burundi. As reported by Rutinwa (2002, 28), a new inux of 250,000
refugees came then from Rwanda from April 28, 1994, within only 24 hours. This
inux generated from the crash of the plane carrying the Presidents of Rwanda and
Burundi is known as the triggering factor of the Rwandan genocide. This movement,
described by the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) as the
largest and fastest exodus it had ever witnessed, was followed in the next two months
by a number of nearly one million refugees eeing Rwanda to Tanzania. To put the
reader into the picture, in 1995, there remained about 700,000 refugees in the region
of Kagera, whose population accounted for about 1.5 million people at that time. 5
Such a human inow, representing more than one third of the regional population
(even more than one half in Karagwe and Ngara districts), had a nancial counter-
part. Interviewees stressed the massive ow of money that entered into the local
economy through the humanitarian pipeline.
4The quantitative analysis presented in this paper has been fed by a two-month iterative eld re-
search (Udry, 2003). In order to rene some of our hypothesis, about 30 interviews were conducted;
data (notably refugee camp location and population) were completed; and some reports were col-
lected to better understand the economic environment of the region and the issues (management,
interaction between refugees and local people) related to the refugee presence.
5Other refugees also came from the Republic Democratic of Congo from 1997. However, our
region of interest, Kagera, did not host these refugees. Congolese camps are mainly located in the
neighboring region of Kigoma.
4The unanticipated and localized nature of the events provides a tool to isolate
the impact of the refugee inows on the local population from other factors. As
witnessed by a local aid worker, \they came very unexpectedly. The local population
was never expecting such a thing. Just overnight, so many people were around ...
They came like a swarm of loco bees". The unanticipated nature of the events
linked to political assassinations is also underlined by AlixGarcia and Saah (2008).
Refugees were hosted in city-sized camps. The unexpectedness together with the
mass of refugees prevented anyone (government, UNHCR) to direct the refugees to
one or more locations across the region that were particularly selected to host the
refugees. Given prohibitive costs to transport them, UNHCR and the Ministry of
Home Aais (MHA) had to select the locations of the camps within a very small
radius. As can be seen in gure 5 and contrary to UNHCR policy, it resulted in
camps located very closed to the borders. 6 While the circumstances for the refugees
at these locations were not ideal to say the least, the unpreparedness of the host
to nd a location for hundreds of thousands refugees removes to a large extent
a potential problem of endogeneity. We will discuss further this issue in section
4.3. Furthermore, a change in the refugee policy implemented by the Tanzanian
Government restricted the movement of the refugees to 4 kilometers around the
camps. 7 These movement restrictions, coupled with geographical features limiting
the spatial spread of the impact (Baez, 2007), provides an exceptional framework to
distinguish refugee-hosting areas from others.
2.2 Observations
Given the magnitude of the phenomenon, the massive inow of refugees is likely to
have aected the local economy. Based on interviews undertaken on the eld in 2008
and secondary sources, the following main impacts have been reported:
 The price of some goods seems to have sharply increased, threatening the food
security of some households. The increase of prices should have resulted from
6Two exceptions appear on the map, i.e. the camps of Burigi and of Mwisa. Both are special
\protection camps", populated by only 10,000 refugees in 1995, compared to 200,000 or even 350,000
for the largest camps.
7Tanzania has a long history of hosting refugees. In 1972, refugees already ed from Burundi
and were directed towards, the so-called old settlements. However, these refugees are very distinct
from the 1993-1994 waves. These \old" refugees are not settled into closed camps; were targeted by
an \open-door" policy whose aim was to integrate these newcomers (even through naturalization)
and ensure self-sustainability of their livelihoods on the Tanzanian territory and were located far
from the borders of their country of origin (Rutinwa, 2002). It has to be noted that despite the
movement restrictions, 1993-1994 refugees could still receive permission to work outside the camp,
provided they came back at night.
5an increasing demand from aid workers but also from the refugees themselves.
The arrival of international organizations (UNHCR, NGOs) and their sta
(local and international) induced a signicant increase in demand from people
with much higher purshasing power. Food aid could also have had an eect
on prices. The World Food Program (WFP), the UN agency in charge of
providing food to refugees, could purchase on the local markets. But the main
eect came from the refugees themselves. In order to diversify their food
diet, refugees exchange the received ratio of maize, maize our or cooking
oil against other products such as bananas, cassava, palm oil, beans, rice,
meat, sh, alcohol, etc. Whitaker (1999) reports that about 75% of the food
distributed to refugees were traded. More conservative assessments by WFP
gives an estimation of about 20-30% (WFP and UNHCR, 1998). Refugees also
sell non-food items such as blankets and plastic sheets. Such trading activities
is easy to observe and even institutionalized by the aid community and the
Ministry of Home Aairs (MHA), through the creation of a so-called common
market around each refugee camp, where refugees and local people were invited
to trade. For example, the common market of Lukole opened between 1994 and
2003 and closed to one of the largest Rwandan refugee camp, is estimated to
have been the biggest market of the Kagera region, after the one of the capital
town (Bukoba).8 Despite these observations, this perceived eect remains an
empirical question. As reported by one of our respondents, while the increase
in price has been imputed to the refugees arrival, it is dicult to distinguish
this increase from the whole issue of ination in the country.
 One of the most often reported eects is the use of refugees as cheap labor by
the local population. Using refugees to till and harvest land, local agricultural
production is reported to have in some cases doubled following the refugee
arrival, land availability not being a major constraint in Kagera (WFP and
UNHCR, 1998). Cheap labour was also used in sectors such as construction,
housekeeping or catering. As conrmed by Pr. Rutinwa, refugees were paid
below the minimum wage that was about 1000 Tzs a day around that time ...
During a focus group he undertook for his study (CSFM, 2003), one woman
declared \ At least one thing we like about these refugees, they are cheaper.
8The common market is one of the rst institution to be closed by the Tanzanian authorities,
when they are planning to close a refugee camp and try to give refugees some incentives to repatriate.
It has also to be noted that in a 2001 article on refugees in Western Tanzania, The Economist
(Economist, 2001) also witnessed such an increase in demand: \Half a million extra months increase
demand for almost everything. The more enterprising locals prot from this, ploughing up extra
acres to take advantage of soaring food prices, selling cooking pots and clothes in the camps, and
even supplying foreign aid workers with chocolate, cheese and satellite-television dishes".
6They are managable in terms of the amount you pay them compared to what
you pay a Tanzanian to do the same amount of work". Such an increase in
cheap labour should generate a downward pressure on the wages of agricul-
tural workers. Whitaker (1999) reports that the wage paid to casual laborers
dropped by about 50% in many areas. Such a depressing eect on wages for the
less skilled is supported by historical evidence provided by Chambers (1986).
 The eect on the wages seems to have been the opposite for the most educated
people. As illustrated by one interviewee who used to be chief accountant in
a cooperative union when the refugees came in, his salary was below 100,000
Tzs, while the drivers of the international organisations could earn more than
200,000 Tzs. This conrmed the observation by Waters (1999) that salaries
in the relief operations were about two to three times the level of salaries for
similar positions elsewhere in Tanzania. The resulting increase in the wage of
more skilled people is also reported to have attracted employees from other
areas. Landau (2004, 45) reports that \A district that was once designated
as a labour reserve has now become a major destination for Tanzanians from
all over the country seeking waged employment with international and non-
governmental organizations."
 Business also seemed to have ourished in the refugee-hosting areas. Whitaker
(1999, 7) underlines that \With the increased local market, there was an up-
surge in business and trade conducted by both local hosts and refugees. Tanza-
nian entrepreneurs from around the country also ocked to the area. Commer-
cial centers developed in the refugee camps with daily markets and countless
shops and restaurants". The economic landscape has completely changed in
this respect. Some sleepy (Ngara market, Omukalinsi) or even desert places
(Lukole, Benaco, etc) became very active market places. Business seemed to
go on even when the refugees repatriate. An aid worker involved in repatria-
tion, underlined how refugees coming originally far away from the Burundian
border, repatriate just behind the border to continue their trading activities.
The variety of non-agricultural products also seemed to have expanded as \sev-
eral enterprising Tanzanians even opened shops with catered to expatriate aid
workers' tastes for chocolate, cheese, European wines and satellite televisions"
(Landau, 2004, 47). This is also the case for local people as some utilities
were sold by refugees and new products (cans, etc) entered this very remote
area. Despite this boom, the impact on the existing businesses was rather
ambiguous. The renewed attractiveness of refugee-hosting areas seems to have
gone along with ercer competition following the entry of other entrepreneurs.
7Such reported increase in competition could have driven some existing petty
businesses out of the market. First, a lot of entrepreneurs are reported to
have come from Mwanza, Shinyanga and other Tanzanian regions to open
a business. People of Haya-origin from Kilimanjaro were often reported as
very business-minded and keen to jump on these new business opportunities.
As underlined by one active district refugee coordinator in one refugee camp,
refugees were also allowed to conduct businesses and were very active in this
respect. One of our respondents also pointed to the `unfair" nature of com-
petition, because of the absence of taxes for commodities traded by refugees
and the free services provided to them: \it was unfair competition because
you cannot compete somebody who has no overhead costs." At the end, the
eect on the existing businesses will be an empirical issue.
 Infrastructure seemed to have largely improved following investment made
by international organisations in terms of road accessibility. Whitaker (1999,
12) noted that \In Kagera region, more than 15 million dollars went towards
the rehabilitation of main and feeder roads, airstrips, and telecommunications
infrastructure", making \internal transportation cheaper and easier for host
communities". This might be more important that it seemed in a region where
the remoteness of the village in which one his born is an important determinant
of the likelihood of growing out of poverty (DeWeerdt, 2006).
 Another important reported eect is the improvement of health and sanitation
services. If the services were not necessarily available to the local population
at the origins of the crisis, the UNHCR and its implementing partners have
progressively made these services available to the local hosts. Around 30% of
the health services beneciaries are reported to be local people. Well, there is
no doubt that the standards of these services are very much higher compared
to what was delivered to the local population in these very remote areas, before
the refugees came in.
 We should also underline the possible destabilizing eects of such population
movements. First, the sudden ow of so many people had devastating en-
vironmental eect (Berry, 2008). As witnessed by one of our respondents,
\When refugees came in, they started to pull down the timber, the wooden
materials from the buildings, ... the schools, even the coee plantations to
get rewood". This had dramatic eect, in particular for women, who had
to allocate more time to collect rewood, in a region where it constitutes the
main source of energy for cooking activities. 9 Although aid workers con-
9Since then, one could observe an increased awarness among aid agencies for this issue. Notably,
8test it given very tight controls they implement, the spread of desease has
been attributed to the coming of refugees living in poor sanitary conditions.
At least, regarding wood collection and desease spreading, one could imagine
that these eects have been spatially more limited than the economic eects
described above (a perimeter of 15-20 kilometers has been reported for the
wood destruction around the camps, in the worst cases). Fieldwork also sug-
gests that these eects have decreased overtime following NGO interventions
in these respects. Finally, security problems have been reported by ocials
and police ocers. The attribution to the refugees of the security problems
has been debated (CSFM, 2003). However, one should, at least, recognize that
the inow of refugees has gone along with a cross-border diusion of weapons
and an increase in criminality (who ever is perpetrating these crimes).
These reported main eects constitute an interesting starting point to understand
the complexity of the issue. Nevertheless, we may wonder what are the magnitude,
the persistency and the spatial distribution of these eects. First, such narrative
evidence does not tell us whether the negative eects are likely to be compensated
by some economic benets. Given the nature of the economic eects, the benets
are also likely to be unevenly redistributed. 10 As a rst approximation, looking at
the change of consumption per adult equivalent (PAE, see data description) for all
surveyed individuals between 1991 and 2004, the last sticks of the gure 2 suggest
that households living closed to refugee camps have increased their consumption
PAE but less proportionally than in other areas. But the picture is qualied when
looking at poverty groups. 11 Initially richer people seem to have better seized the
opportunities generated by the proximity to refugee camps. They indeed increased
their consumption PAE much more (about 38%) than their counterparts in other
areas (about 16%). On the contrary, the poorest have seen their situation improved
devastated areas around old camps (for example in Karagwe) contrast with more recent Congolese
camps in the region of Kigoma where wood collection has been strongly regulated.
10Many respondents were quite aware of this inequality eect : \ Those who were creative, who
were business-minded, they made a lot of money. Even in the villages, those who are farmers,
everything produced on the farm, had a market there. For all over the district, it was going there
on bycicle, going to get money from the camps. The situation was worst for the most vulnerable
groups like the eldery who do not know what to eat next days, those with inability, those with
chronic illness but those who were energetic, creative, they made a good money out of it."
11Following Collier et al. (1986), we transformed the consumption data of the KHDS data (see
data description) by adult equivalent and taking into account price dierences between locations.
Based on 1991 data, we create four groups, which should reect the level of poverty in the sample.
The identication of people in a village closed to a refugee camp is based on the reply from the
community leader to the KHDS question \were there any refugee settlement closed by?". As we
will see, more suitable identication criteria are described in section 4.1.
9less (10%) than their counterparts in other areas (16%). Such chart suggests that
the Chambers (1986)'s hidden losers can well hide some winners. Second, we do not
have any idea about the persistency of the above reported eects. For example, the
changes in factor prices (wages, prices of goods, ...) should have been followed by
modications in the consumption and production behaviors. As suggested above,
some negative eects (wood devastation, disease risk) may have been reduced over-
time. Therefore, section 3 will study in a general equilibrium setting how changes
in the good and labour markets will aect dierently several agents of the local
economy. Finally, we do not only conjecture economic gains to be distributed dier-
ently among the refugee-hosting population. Figure 3 also indicates that contrary
to the common wisdom considering the presence of refugees uniquely as a burden,
the establishment of refugee camp does not either generate more people to get out
of the sample (due to untraced migration or death) between 1991 and 2004 or give
more incentives to migrate (traced) outside the initial village.12 Clearly, the estab-
lishment of a refugee camp does not only generate negative externalities. Given the
localized nature of the negative eects (environmental degradation, disease, etc), we
might then wonder whether the balance between economic benets and costs diers
over space. The existence of a non-monotonic relationship between the proximity
to refugee camps and welfare is an empirical question. On the one hand, some re-
spondents were convinced that villages very closed to refugee camps, all in all, suer
from the negative eects, while habitants at intermediate distance could maximize
the economic benets generated by the establishment of refugee camps and minimize
the costs. 13 On the other hand, other respondents clearly reject this non-monotonic
12Among the 3794 individuals that were interviewed in 1991 and 2004 in our database (therefore,
traced when moving from their original village to another village, another region or another country),
2,830 individuals are still living in the same location (75%) in 2004. The emigration rate computed
by village is quite unevenly distributed (from 8% to 43%). What appears rather clear is that the
establishment of refugee camps does not seem to have been a big dispersion force. On the contrary, a
higher share of the population followed overtime tend to move away from unaected villages. If the
same exercise was performed with the active population, i.e. 1,330 individuals followed overtime,
1011 lived in 2004 in the same village than 10 years ago (76%). The contrast between refugee-
hosting communities (17%) and others (26%) is even stronger, conrming the slight indication that
contrary to common wisdom, the establishment of a refugee camp may well be an attraction force.
13In a report drafted in September 1995 (about one year and a half after the arrival of Rwandan
refugees) for a local NGO, Adams et al. (1995, 31) support such a non-monotonic relationship by
stating that \While the whole district has been aected by the arrival of the refugees (through
improved transport links, rising prices, loss of livestock, damage of schools and hospitals, the re-
direction of already over-streched district services to the refugees, an expanding economy, increased
opportunities for trade, etc), the negative consequences have tended been very localized. Those
villages in the immediate vicinity of the camp have borne the brunt of theft and robbery, the loss
of water, fuel and construction materials, threats to household food security, health problems, and
social change."
10hypothesis. For them, the economic benets such as health accessibility, outweigh
the negative externalities, even for the closest to refugee camps. Given our questions
related to the persistency and the distribution of the above eects, the paper will
seek to assess, both theoretically and empirically, how the establishment of refugee
camps in the region of Kagera has aected the local population in the long run and
through which channels. A particular attention will be given in section 4 to allow
for a dierentiated eect of such establishment over space.
3 Theoretical framework
The theoretical framework should help us to identify how agents may adapt to the
refugee arrival and the related changes in factor prices. The purpose is to describe
how some agents may be able to benet from the inow of refugees, while others
seem to suer from it. The below theoretical model will mainly focus on the eects
on the labour and good markets. 14 Controlling for other factors or explanations
will be an empirical issue.
We represent a local economy whose population (normalised to one) is composed
of H landed people and L landless people. The landed people are endowned with
one unit of land, that can be invested in one of the two sectors of the economy,
the agricultural sector or the manufacturing sector (non-agricultural). The landless
people are composed of La agricultural workers and Lm manufacturing workers.
3.1 Preferences
The preferences of all individuals are represented by Cobb-Douglas preferences, with
CES sub-utility for the dierentiated non-agricultural goods. The utility of the
agent i is composed of its consumption of homogeneous agricultural good A and
dierentiated non-agricultural goods M.
14AlixGarcia and Saah (2008) use another framework to understand how refugee inows aect
local prices, through food aid provision. Although interesting, we cannot use a similar framework
given our focus on long-run General Equilibrium eects and the distribution of these eects. Our
theoretical framework could also be compatible with a New Economic Geography (NEG) extension
that would be able to incorporate in a GE setting the change in transportation costs and the
mobility of some agents, possibly induced by the refugee inows.










with  > 1
s.t. GM + paA  Y
 represents the elasticity of substitution between two varieties of the non-
agricultural good, while G is the price index of the non-agricultural goods.
From the identical preferences of the individuals, one can obtain the demand











The indirect utility function will be given by introducing the demand functions





with  = (1   )1 
(7)
3.2 Technologies
The economy is represented with two sectors of production. The agricultural sector
performs under constant returns to scale, using one unit of land and La units of
agricultural labor. The non-agricultural sector exhibits increasing returns to scale,
with non-agricultural labor as an input. We assume that the price of the agricultural
good is equal to 1.
a = qa   waLa (8)
with qa = L
a
12The rst-order condition gives wa = L 1
a and a = (1   )L
a. The non-
agricultural sector needs  variable requirement of skilled labor Lm and one landed
person, who decides to become entrepreneur. The structure of this sector is the
monopolistic competition.
m = pmqm   wmqm   wm (9)
Deriving m with respect to pm gives p = 
 1wm, i.e. the monopolistic com-
petition result following which the mark-up of price over marginal cost is constant.
By the zero prot condition, the equilibrium production is independent of the num-
ber of entrepreneurs: q =  1
 . Equalizing this equilibrium production with the
demand equation, we obtain the following wage equation, i.e. the wage given to the




Hm   (Lm + Hm)
[ + (1   )Ha] (10)
We can show that the non-agricultural wage will be positive provided the number
of non-agricultural workers is suciently large. Otherwise, the non-agricultural
sector does not exist.
wm > 0 if Lm >
   
(1   )
( + (1   )H) = f Lm (11)
This condition will be most easily met if:
  is low, i.e. the non-agricultural goods are suciently dierentiated.
  is large, i.e. the constant share of expenditure on non-agricultural goods
should be suciently large.
 H is low, i.e. the number of landed people should be small enough.
  is small, i.e. the labor productivity in the agricultural sector should be small
enough.
Equalizing wm and a determines the distribution of non-agricultural entrepreneurs:
Hm =




Given the fact that Hm does not depend on La, a change in landless agricultural
workers, which represent the refugee inow in our present case, can be shown to aect
the dierent agents through two channels: the changes in income and in prices. Va,
Va and Vm denote respectively the indirect utility of the agricultural worker, the
landed investing in agricultural activities, the landed becoming a non-agricultural
entrepreneur. We assume that given the existence of the non-agricultural sector,
Lm > f Lm.
 The agricultural worker suers from an increase both in competition on the
labour market (wa
La < 0) and in prices following the demand pressure on the
good market ( G








G2 < 0 (13)
 The landed investing in agricultural activities benets from an increase in its
agricultural rent ( a
La > 0) but suers from the increase in the price index
( G
La > 0). Given the fact that Hm does not depend on La, one can show that
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> 0 if Lm > f Lm (15)
 The non-agricultural entrepreneur (also true for the non-agricultural worker)
also benets from an increase of its income but has to support an increase in
the price index. However, given the fact that Hm does not depend on La and
La increases wm, one can show that the indirect utility of the non-agricultural














Based on the theoretical predictions, this section seeks to assess the relationship
between the refugee inow and the welfare of the hosting population. Furthermore,
we would like to see whether the net costs and/or the net benets are likely to be
unevenly distributed among the refugee-hosting population.
4.1 Data description
We use the Kagera Health and Development Survey (KHDS) dataset collected by
Economic Development Initiatives (EDI) and the World Bank (Beegle et al., 2006).
Based on the World Bank LSMS (Living Standards Measurement Study) standards,
the KHDS data provide a very comprehensive survey on several dimensions of the
individual and household well-being such as the levels of consumption, income, as-
sets, the occurrence of shocks, but also some community and facilities characteristics
such as the availability of public services, the participation to collective groups, etc.
In 1991-1994 (4 waves), the KHDS interviewed up to four times 915 households and
their members from fall 1991 to January 1994. As illustrated by the stars on gure
4, the households were selected from 51 communities, from the 6 districts of the re-
gion of Kagera. In addition to the representativeness of this survey, one interesting
feature of this survey is the outstanding exercise of tracing most individuals from
the original 915 households, about ten years later, in 2004. Because people had
move out from their original households, the KHDS 2004 interviewed about 2,700
households and their members, including those having moved outside their village of
origin, the Kagera region and even Tanzania. As indicated by Beegle et al. (2006),
the eld team achieved an excellent rate of recontact of 93%.
These data are particularly adequate for assessing the impact of the refugee
inows of 1993-1994 on the local population. First, we can be certain that the rst
wave of the KHDS surveys has been undertaken before October 21, 1993, date of the
assassination of the President of Burundi and signaling the start of the refugee crisis
in the Kagera region. 15 Therefore, the data should allow us to distinguish the eect
of the refugee inows from some initial dierences between villages, households or
individuals. Second, the location of the dierent villages throughout all the region
allows us to introduce a key heterogeneity in our sample, depending on whether the
15Given the procedure followed to interview a household (i.e. when one household drops it is
replaced by a new one starting again wave 1), the facts that the rst passage of eldwork took
place between September 1991 and May 1992, that each passage lasts between 6 and 7 months, and
that no household was interviewed for the rst time in the fourth passage, a household would be
interviewed in the rst wave in July 1993 at the latest (the majority between September 1991 and
may 1992).
15individuals are living in a village closed to a refugee camp or not. We use a sample of
3,510 individuals and 812 households (that duplicate into 2126 households by 2004),
that have been interviewed in 1991 (before October 21, 1993) and in 2004. 16
 The dependent variable is computed as the consumption (transformed into log)
per adult equivalent, in real 2004 prices. The adult equivalent transformation
is applied using the method proposed by Collier et al. (1986) for Tanzania,
while the Lapeyres and Fisher indexes are used for price correction. 17
 The treatment variable should capture the impact of the refugee camp per se.
One possibility is to use a dummy variable, denoted RC, indicating whether
the community leader has replied positively to the KHDS question \Were
there any refugee settlements closed by?". 18 Less vulnerable to reporting
errors, our eldwork allows us to proxy the eect of the establishment of a
refugee camp by the distance between any village and the refugee camps as
well as the estimated number of refugees by camp (using the 1995 estimates
of the refugee population collected through eldwork and considered as the
peak time of the refugee presence). We compute an average of the refugee
population weighted by an exponential distance function, called the refugee
impact : RIh;v =
P13
c=1 exp dv;cpopc, where c, from 1 to 13 refugee camp,
 = 1 and v is the village where the household h is living.
 The activity variables dene the main occupation of each household. The main
occupations introduced are subsistence agriculture, agricultural self-employed
, wage employment (distinction between unskilled -farming and sheries - and
skilled labour is made), and non-agricultural self-employment (business and
livestock). To determine what is the main occupation of a household, we rst
compute on the basis of the time spent in a particular activity by each house-
hold member and the value of prots or wage realized through this activity,
the total income generated by each household and the share of this income
16To be more precise, from 3796 individuals followed overtime, 254 individuals have been dropped
due to missing income data and 32 due to duplication for reasons given in Beegle et al. (2006, 39).
17The aggregated consumption data provided by EDI (http://www.edi-africa.com) have been
used for comparability reasons (recall periods, common denition of components).
18It has to be noted that Baez (2007) uses the fact to belong to the districts of Ngara and Karagwe
as an identication. We have some concerns about using this indicator as it might rather capture
a district-specic unobserved eect rather than the eects of the refugees. First, all villages from
Ngara and Karagwe districts do not all report a closed-by refugee settlement. Only eight out of
eleven do so. Furthermore, four villages in three neighboring districts also report closed-by refugee
settlements. Provided we use the community questionnaire as identication criteria, this would
represent 12 villages, i.e. approximately 192 households out of about 816 households or 24%. It
represents between 31 and 29 percent of the population in Kagera region.
16over the total income generated by this household. We apply the Lapeyres
and Fisher index and the adult equivalent method of Collier et al. (1986). 19
We dene a main activity as the one for which the percentage is above the
average of the rest of the population. This makes the denition less depen-
dent to an arbitrary threshold (like e.g. larger than one half) but disregard
the marginal income sources. 20 For example, any household generating 99%
of his income from subsistence income and 1% from business is better to be
considered as mainly involved in subsistence agriculture. On the contrary, a
household doing more than 15% of his income (sample average) will be consid-
ered as doing business. It also means that one household can have more than
one main activity, in case it would specialize into two activities. The activity
variables combined with the refugee one will be key to see whether dierent
payos are associated with some activities in refugee-hosting areas, compared
to other (control) villages.
 Household characteristics are introduced, such as the size of the household,
the proportion of literate members, the number of children, the value of land
19We use the aggregated data given in the 1991-1994 KHDS database and apply the same methods
described in KHDS (2004) to compute the 2004 data. For subsistence income, we convert the value
of each consumed item according to its amount, its season and its imputed value. The income from
self-employed agricultural activities is computed on the basis of the gross revenues minus the costs
of household-level activities in farming. Employment income is recognized as the income received as
an employee of a private individual or of an institution other than the household, for remuneration in
cash or in kind (KHDS, 2004). The household-level value is computed by summing the employment
income earned by each member, multiplied by the time this member reports to have worked at
each job in the last 12 months. The Laspeyres and PAE transformation have been applied. We
replicate the KHDS (2004) method for the year 2004 to compute the non-agricultural self-employed
activities.We compute the livestock income by computing the net revenues from livestock. The
second method based on reported net revenues and proposed by KHDS (2004) is used. deMel
et al. (2009) indeed show that using reported prots provides more accurate measure of prots
than the method using (underreported) revenues and expenses. Fishing activities are also added to
this category to make 1991 data comparable with 2004 data. One technical problem for the non-
agricultural activities appears regarding the way we should treat losses. Indeed as some losses are
encountered, some share of income are above 1 or below 0. For 1991, we have about 4 households
(or 16 individuals) who have a share of income generated from business above 1, mainly due to
losses in the agricultural sector, and about 4 households (or 16 individuals) who have a negative
share of income due to business losses. For 2004, the former increases to 92 individuals and the
later reduces to one individual. We restrict the negative values to zero.
20For another issue (work satisfaction) but a similar choice of threshold, Winkelmann and Winkel-
mann (1998) also take the sample average as a threshold. 63 households out of 1966 households
in our baseline regression did not appear to have any main occupation with this denition. These
households have been classied in the subsistence category given the fact they generate the largest
part of their income from this activity. However, our results are robust to the exclusion of these
households from our regressions.
17as the main asset of the household (transformed in PAE and into logarithm).
 As explained below, other variables will be introduced and explain progres-
sively.
Descriptive statistics are given in tables 1 and 2.
4.2 Baseline results
We start by estimating the following regression at the household level, h:
log(Vhtv) = 0 + 1(RItv) + 2Activityhtv + 3Activityhtv  RItv
+ 4Zhtv + 5t + 6h + 
(17)
 Vhtv represents the indirect utility of the household h living in village v at
time t, measured by the consumption per adult equivalent, correcting for price
dierences, as explained above.
 RI is the treatment variable, dening the extent to which a household is
aected by the refugee inow. As explained above, we use an inverse distance
function (exponential) weighting the 1995 refugee population.
 Activity denes the main occupation(s) of the household h.
 Z represents some household characteristics such as the size of the household,
the number of children, the proportion of literate members and the stock of
land assets.
 h and t are respectively a household xed eect and a time dummy
Like most household panel analysis, we start by restricting our sample of house-
holds to the members that have not been traced (excluding new households and/or
those that have moved to another location). A household xed eect is used to
reduce the endogeneity risk by controlling for any unobserved time-constant house-
hold characteristics, while a time dummy captures any change overtime which is
common across all villages. This seems to be particularly important when introduc-
ing the activity variables, as unobserved household characteristics might determine
the choice of activities and aect the ability of the household to increase his con-
sumption overtime. Like for all our specications, to correct for heteroskedasticity
and correlation of errors within the same district, we use robust standard errors in
18the baseline regressions, by clustering at this level (Bertrand et al., 2004). In col-
umn (1) of table 3, we found a non-signicant coecient for the eect of the refugee
impact on welfare. In the rest of the table, we found a non-monotonic relationship
between the establishment of refugee camps and the dependent variable. We also
introduce the activity variables. With the exception of the non-agricultural worker
who seems to benet from the refugee presence, none of our theoretical predictions
are supported. 21 However, these results should be considered with suspicion as they
may be threatened by important estimation biases. As in many panel data analysis
that do not interview those creating a new household (e.g. children in 1991 that
compose a family before 2004), table 3 does not include the split-o households. As
explained by Dercon and Shapiro (2007) and Verwimp and Bundervoet (2008), not
including the split-o households may create some bias in the estimations. Assume
for example, that those who create a new household are younger and more able to
adapt to economic changes (eventually induced by the arrival of refugees), you would
underestimate the welfare of the original household by only comparing those who
still belong to the original household in 1991 and 2004. In other words, a selection
bias can be introduced if the split-o households have dierent characteristics com-
pared with the members of their initial households (Witoelar, 2005). The sample
used to compute table 4 includes the split-o households in a household xed eect
framework. To focus on the impact on the local hosts, we exclude, in a rst analysis,
the households that have migrated outside the region of Kagera between 1991 and
2004. Nevertheless, although they are excluded from the sample, we still need to
take into account that these households have changed location. 22 Otherwise, we
could introduce an important omitted variable bias. Migration is indeed known as
an important household strategy to smooth consumption overtime (Rosenzweig and
Stark, 1989; Stark, 1991) but could also aect other explanatory variables such as
the choice of activity. Migration could aect the familly labour cost (e.g. in agricul-
tural activities) or help to enter into some activities thanks to the role of nancial
21In regression (4), like in all the remaining specications, we test the robustness of our results
to the inclusion of (time-varying) village dummies. Results with this dummy should be considered
carefully as it results to a re-classication procedure. Out of 994 people who belong to a household
which has moved in a village nearby or elsewhere in Kagera, 217 have moved in a known village
and could be hence re-classify accordingly. The remaining people moving in unknown village but
known district, have been reclassied in a new cluster for each district.
22Migration is likely to be an important phenomenon to control for. Collier et al. (1986) already
stated that \In Tanzania migration is known to be a phenomenon with a long history which aects
a very substantial part of the population." In our sample, we have about 608 individuals out of
3510 individuals who have moved outside their village (or a neighboring village). Interestingly, it
is only slightly lower than the more restrictive (outside original village) ratio (27 %) obtained by
Collier et al. (1986) with another sample and at another time.
19intermediary that could be played by the migrant (Stark, 1980; Taylor and Wyatt,
1996). Table 4 introduces the proportion of the initial household members who have
moved outside the region of Kagera (either in Tanzania or in Uganda) as well as
the household decision to move outside the village of origin and its neighborhood
within the Kagera region. Working with panel data, we complete these variables
by the reported history of past migration of the household (proportion of migrants
reported in 1991). Nevertheless, the migration variables could be endogenous due to
simultaneity or omitted variable problem. As usual in migration studies, you need
to clarify the causal link between the change in welfare and the migration decision.
In other words, you do not know whether the decision to migrate is explained by
the change in consumption or some unobserved characteristics (skills, motivations,
etc) of the household or the opposite. Therefore, we use instrumental variables to
deal with the endogeneity of the migration decisions. Similar to Scott Rozelle and
deBrauw (1999), we construct an instrumental variable, capturing the spillover ef-
fect at the village level, i.e. the number of migrants by village but excluding the
ones of the concerned household. We also compute the past value of this instrument,
using 1991 data. Regarding the decision to migrate within the region of Kagera, we
also use the proportion of the initial household migrating, excluding the concerned
household to keep this instrument exogenous to the decision to move itself. Table 5
shows the rst-stage xed eect regressions. As expected, the measurements of mi-
gration spillovers positively aect our migration variables, with a highly signicant
F-test. The Anderson Correlation LR statistics rejects the null hypothesis of un-
deridentication, while given the Stock and Yogo (2005) statistics, we can strongly
reject the null hypothesis of weak instruments. Given the Hansen overidentication
test, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that our instrumental variables are valid.
23
Regression (1)-(4) of table 4 use the sample that includes the split-os and the
migration variables, without instrumental variables. We turn to regressions (5)-(8)
that deal with the potential endogeneity of the migration variables. Regression (5)
of table 4 at least indicates that, when split-o households are included and con-
trary to common wisdom, the establishment of refugee camps does not only release
negative externalities on the local population. The impact is rather small but still
is on average signicant and positive. An increase by a standard deviation of the RI
index would on average increase the consumption per adult equivalent by about only
1%. That is being said, our results also shed light on the two hypothesis that had
23We had to partial out some variables to test the validity of our instruments. Our procedure
was rst to check if our coecients and standard errors remain unaltered when partialling out the
household-specic variables (size, proportion of literate members and the value of land holding) and
then, correct the covariance matrix to make such tests feasible.
20been formulated in the previous sections. First, our theoretical framework suggests
that the eects on the good and labour markets are likely to be unevenly distributed
among the local population. Therefore, we introduce the activity variables dened
in section 4.1. Results should be compared to households whose main occupation
is subsistence agriculture and who are likely to be the least aected by the refugee
impact on the labour and good markets. Very consistently throughout our vari-
ous specications, those involved in agricultural activities as self-employed farmers
appear to be better-o by the refugee presence, compared to their counter-parts in
other areas. Among the winners, are also to be found the workers in non-agricultural
activities. Such result is consistent with the evidence that skilled workers have been
relativelly better valued by NGOs and international organizations in refugee-hosting
areas. One of the most negatively aected by the refugee camps seems to be the
agricultural worker, likely to face ercer competition on the labour markets and in-
creased prices for his purchases. An increase by a standard deviation of the RI index
(at average level) would deteriorate the welfare of the agricultural worker by about
8-10% (see columns (3) and (4) of table 13). Despite the reported boom in this sec-
tor, our results suggest that those involved in business activities would experience a
welfare deterioration following a similar change of the RI index of about 10-12% (see
table 13). One possible explanation is the reported increase in competition in the
business sector, following the arrival of more productive entrepreneurs from other
regions (given the tracing nature of our data, newcomers are not included in our
sample) who would have driven the existing local businesses out of the market. Al-
though not treated specically in the theoretical model, those involved in livestock
are better-o. 24 Such positive eect is not only explained by the increased demand
both from refugees and non-governmental organizations but mainly by a disruption
of the supply of livestock at the time of the refugee arrival. In a mission identication
report, the World Food Program (Program, 1995, 4) describes the evolution of the
livestock sector in the two districts that have massively hosted refugees : \Livestock
is widespread everywhere but only in some areas were large cattle established after
independence with the arrival of Tutsis refugees from Rwanda, who brought their
herds with them. In 1984, in Ngara, around 18,000 head of cattle were recorded
and 128,000 in Karagwe ... As a result of refugees inux, about 50% of the cattle
population in some major livestock keeping villages of Ngara district were taken out
of the country when the Tutsis decided to return to Rwanda after the RPF gov-
ernment took power there, leaving Ngara and Karagwe with only about 8,000 and
65,000 cattle respectively."
24Those activities were merged with the business activities in previous works. The same results
than the ones provided for the business activities were found.
21Among the household control variables, the positive and negative coecients of
respectivelly the proportion of literate members within the household and the size of
the household need to be underlined. As expected, being a split-o household also
positively aect the household welfare. Consistently with Beegle et al. (2007), table
4 also shows that the correlation between welfare and migration is only attributed
to unobserved household characteristics that determine the migration decisions. Fi-
nally, our eldwork helps us to hypothesize a non-monotonic relationship between
the refugee impact and welfare. We found some rst indications of a U-shaped rela-
tionship between RI and the dependent variable. Nevertheless, it appears to be the
reverse than the one that was expected. Our results suggest that the closer you are
or the biggest the refugee population is, the more you benet from it. By contrast,
at some distant point or below a certain level of refugee population, you might suer
from the refugee presence. In the section 4.3.2, we will discuss further how we could
understand the roots of this potential non-monotonic relationship.
4.3 Discussion and robustness
4.3.1 Robustness
We have imposed a particular structure to our baseline specication by adopting a
household xed eect specication and by restricting our sample to those household
members who have not migrated outside the region of Kagera. First, the use of a
household xed eect imposes the assumption that the split-o households become
independent from its initial household. A dierent assumption would be that the
split-o households are altruist vis- a-vis their family and therefore, pool all their
income and their consumption with their initial household. Altonji et al. (1992) and
Witoelar (2005) propose a method to actually test the altruist hypothesis. Using
an initial household xed eect, an altruist household would result in a distribu-
tion of consumption per adult equivalent within the extended family independent
of the distribution of income (net of remittances). Table 6 strongly rejects the null
hypothesis of altruism among households of our sample, as the income net of trans-
fers positively aects the consumption per adult equivalent when controlling for an
initial household xed eect and other time-varying household-caracteristics. This
result holds, using dierent samples and dierent instrumental variables to deal with
the potential endogenity of the income variable. 25
25More information is given in the explanatory note of table 6. For comparability reasons, we rst
use in regressions (1) and (2) the instruments proposed by Witoelar (2005), i.e. the value of land,
of farm productive equipments and of non-farm productive assets. However, we have some doubts
about the exogenous nature of these instrumental variables. Said dierently, we might suspect these
variables to aect the consumption variable, by another channel than the income eect. Therefore,
22Second, one concern might be related to the way migratory ows would aect
our results. On the one hand, a catastrophic view on the refugee crisis might suspect
that the coecient of the RI index is overestimated because of an attrition problem.
In other words, if local people tend to die (e.g. due to disease) or escape the refugee-
hosting areas (without being traced), our results might only reect the change of
welfare of those better equipped to face such a shock. However, given the lower
attrition and emigration rates depicted in chart 5, we can rule out this possibility. On
the other hand, the opposite might also be true. The magnitude of our coecients
might be underestimated, as the mobility of some agents would tend to reduce the
magnitude of the impact, notably through economic activities. Although section 1
gives clear reasons for the localized nature of the refugee impact, our estimates can
then be considered as a lower-bound of the real impact. We also remind that in order
to reduce this bias, we control for migration variables. As a robustness check, table
7 considers a sample that would include those who have migrated. In this case, we
change the migration variables by introducing dummies indicating directly whether
the household head has decided to migrate outside the region of Kagera. Table 7
conrms our main results. 26 Third, table 8 tests whether our results capture long-
lasting eects. Indeed, we use the fact that refugees from Burundi and Rwanda
dier in their duration of stay in Tanzania. Refugees from Rwanda have indeed
been repatriated in 1996 while the last refugees from Burundi left the region of
Kagera in July 2008. Although we should remain cautious about the interpretation
of this table 27, the eects of the refugee presence appear to be long-lasting, with
the exception of the direct eect. The next section will help us to better understand
the interpretation to be given to this direct eect.
we introduce the distance through road networks to the main trading partners as an instrumental
variables. The rst-stage regressions are also provided in table 6. Such instrumental strategy is
applied to both samples, excluding or including the households migrating outside the region of
Kagera.
26The overidentication test sheds some doubts on the validity of the instruments in this setting.
When the migrants are included, we actually use an additional instrumental variable, which is the
corrected proportion of migrants of the initial household. The rejection of the test backs our prefer-
ences for a model excluding migrants, while controlling for migration within the households. Second,
this could provide an indication that migration may result from an enlarged household strategy and
therefore, could aect the dependent variable through another channel than the potential endoge-
nous variable, when migrants are included. Coping strategies adopted in a refugee-hosting context
is a subject of further research.
27We keep this distinction as a robustness checks, because we are likely to capture unobserved
dierences between refugees from Rwanda and Burundi. For example, the environmental degrada-
tion is reported to have been much ercer in Rwandan refugee camps, while such degradation has
been much more under control in more recent Burundian camps. On the contrary, refugees from
Rwanda were reported to be much more skilled or hard-working.
23Finally, a legitimate concern might be related to the exogenous nature of the
location of the camps. In other words, one could worry that the location of the
camps would be linked to unobserved village caracteristics. For example, Baez (2007,
12) argues that\poorer regions that are highly disadvantaged in some unobservable
domains may be relatively more likely to [...] host more refugees (e.g. limited
institutions and systems to control their arrival or assist them). If that is the case,
any association between the number of refugees and welfare measures of domestic
inhabitants will likely be driven by the underlying correlation between the level of
development of host regions and these two outcomes rather than by the causal eect
of the exposure to refugees." On this point, we disagree with Baez (2007). First
of all, controlling the border was not at all something in the hands of the local
authorities. The refugee inow was so massive that at that time, it was before all
a security issue and borders were of the military resort. The choice of location was
mainly taken by the Ministry of Home Aairs and UNHCR. Among the criteria
reported to have been used, there was an important cost issue. As described in the
contextual section of this paper, the refugee inow was the largest in UNHCR history
and highly unanticipated. In October-November 1993, the inux of refugees was so
sudden that refugees stayed closed to local communities, without formal assistance
up to April 1994. They were so numerous that it was reported to be too costly to
move them far away from the border. Therefore, contrary to the UNHCR handbook
of Emergencies and international law recommendations, refugee camps were located
pretty close to the border. So, if there was a choice of location to be made, this
choice was restricted in the area close to the border. In addition, as conrmed by
ocials, this was reinforced by the willingness of the Tanzanian government to ease
the repatriation process and reduce as quick as possible the risk to create a small
Rwandan or Burundian conict within the Tanzanian borders. Such geographic
restrictions on the choice of location certainly reduce the endogeneity problem. Our
identication strategy indeed rests on the fact that there was no choice of location
between far away and close villages. Regressing the RI index on the 1991 values of
the explanatory variables and the consumption per adult equivalent, table 9 (part
A, columns 1 and 2) even shows that the refugee presence is not signicantly related
to 1991-dened characteristics. Furthermore, given the fact the choice of location
was constraint in the border areas due to transport cost issue, we repeat the same
exercise, restricting the sample to Ngara and Karagwe, the two border districts.
The part B of table 9) indicates that the RI index is not statistically related to 1991
explanatory variables.
244.3.2 Interpretation : Scale versus spatial eect?
Based on our baseline estimation (table 4), we have already pointed that the estab-
lishment of refugee camps (more exactly, a positive change of a standard deviation
at an average RI) has on average a positive and signicant impact of less than 1%
on welfare. This is a very small impact but we found a very dierentiated eects on
the local population. The main winners seem to be the skilled workers that enjoy
increased job opportunities and the self-employed farmers who could benet from a
very cheap labour force. However, using the most robust results (columns (7) and
(8) of table 4), columns (3) and (4) of table 13 qualify this nding. In net terms,
the non-agricultural worker will benet from the refugee presence, only if he is very
close to a refugee camp and if the refugee population is very large. At an average
value of the RI index, its welfare will slightly decrease following an increase by a
standard deviation of this index while at the maximal value of the index (i.e. the
closest village or the most populated refugee camp), he will improve his situation
by a percentage of 11-12%. A similar qualication applies to another winner, the
self-employed farmer. On the contrary, the main losers, i.e. the agricultural worker
and those involved in business will experience a deterioration of their welfare (in a
range of about 10-12% at the average RI index) but this negative eect will also be
softened, the closer they are located to a refugee camp or the more numerous the
refugee population is. Such qualied interpretation comes from the non-monotonic
relationship found between the RI index and the welfare of the local population.
Table 13 indicates that the minimum of the U-shaped relationship found between
the RI index and the dependent variable is low but stands within the range of pos-
sible values. Independently of the main occupations of the households, a variation
of the standard deviation of the RI index (at the average level) would decrease con-
sumption per adult equivalent by about 4-6%, while at the closest and/or the most
refugee-populated village, it could increase consumption by about 7-8%.
Despite this above interpretation, the non-monotonic relationship between the
RI index and the dependent variable does not necessarily receive easy interpreta-
tion. Indeed, one does not know whether the relationship is driven by its spatial
component (proximity to refugee camps) or its scale component (size of the refugee
population). One possible approach is to introduce alternative treatment variables
to be able to decompose a scale eect from a spatial one. Tables 10 and 11 introduce
four alternative variables of interest. Columns (1) to (3) of table 10 use the simple
dummy variable indicating whether the community leader replies positively to the
question \Were there any refugee settlement close by?". Such variable is not signif-
icant and is likely to be very noisy given possible reported and measurement errors.
Regressions (4) to (6) restrict the computation of the RI index for each village to the
25closest refugee camp. Our previous results are conrmed with similar coecients.
Such simplication allows us to decompose the RI index for the closest camp into
a scale and a spatial dimension. Table 11 presents the results. The spatial dimen-
sion seems to keep a similar non-monotonic relationship. However, the minimum
stands largely above the range of possible values. On the contrary, the eect through
economic activities, seems to be well captured by the spatial decay function. The op-
posite is true for the scale dimension. The non-monotonic relationship is conrmed,
while the eects through economic activities are less precisely captured. The next
step is then to introduce simultaneously the two dimensions, like in table 12. We
have a conrmation that it is the scale dimension which is driving the non-monotonic
shape. Such a result might seem surprising but this suggests that a minimum mass
of refugees is needed to generate positive externalities that would benet the local
population (independently of the main economic occupations). Looking at the mini-
mum of the U-shaped relationship, table 13 indicates that this minimum mass could
amount to about 72,000 refugees. Such a gure should be considered with a great
degree of cautiousness. For us, it does not contradict the UNHCR recommendations
to its own sta that in general, \large camps of over 20,000 people should gener-
ally be avoided" (UNHCR, 1982) because of possible problems of accommodation,
security, etc. We indeed do not consider these internal constraints to the size of
a refugee camp. However, our results could suggest that in this approximation of
the optimal size, UNHCR should internalize the eect of the size on the local hosts,
which is not necessarily as expected. A smaller size is not unavoidably optimal. For
the activity variables, the scale dimension is only relevant for the agricultural sector
for which the number of refugees would determine the size of the workforce. The
spatial dimension also seems to describe a non-monotonic relationship, i.e. an in-
verted U-shaped function, backing our eldwork hypothesis that very closed village
would suer the most from negative externalities. Nevertheless, the maximum point
stands again outside the range of possible values (276.7 corresponding to about -
32.5 kilometers). being on the right-hand tail of the inverted U, such result tends
to suggest that despite the existence of negative externalities, the closer you are,
the best it is for your welfare. Furthermore, the spatial dimension explains very
much the eects on the non-agricultural sector. Contrary to the agricultural sec-
tor very sensitive to the number of refugees, the ercer competition exerted on the
business sector and the increased job opportunities for non-agricultural workers ap-
pear to be very localized around the refugee camps. Finally, the discussion on the
potential endogeneity of the RI index could be extended to the alternative refugee-
related variables introduced in this section. As can be seen in table 9, the same
conclusions on the exogenous nature of the camp location apply. An exception is
26raised for the scale dimension when the sample is restricted to the border districts.
Larger refugee camps are associated with lower consumption per adult equivalent
and fewer households holding non-agricultural labour as a main occupation. There-
fore, the average positive estimate should be rather considered as a lower bound if
one assumes that this association is not random. To sum up, the unexpectedness
and the magnitude of the inow coupled with the unpreparedness of the Tanzanian
and international authorities to the refugee inows make us condent to deal with
a solid quasi-experiment. Still, even if one doubts about the endogenous nature of
the refugee camps, statistical evidence also suggests it would only impose a lower
bound on the welfare-improving eect of a larger refugee camp.
5 Conclusions
Following an iterative eldwork that helps us to clarify some hypothesis, the paper
sheds some light on the impact of refugee inows on their local hosts. Contrary to
conventional wisdom, we found on average a slightly positive impact on local people
welfare. However, such an impact appears to be highly dierentiated among the
refugee-hosting population. The agricultural worker suered from ercer compe-
tition on the labour markets and increased prices on the good markets in refugee-
hosting areas. On the policy side, programs (e.g. education, micronance, etc) might
target those agricultural workers to help them to cope with such a shock on the local
economy. On the contrary, those involved in agricultural activities as self-employed
farmers, have beneted from the supply of a cheap labour force while the worker
in the non-agricultural sector tends to have improved their situation (as skills have
been highly valued by NGOs and international organizations). In disagreement with
our theoretical prediction, the self-employed in business activities does not seem to
have improved its welfare, on the contrary. Such results contrast with the business
boom reported by interview respondents during our eldwork. Possible reconcili-
ations might call for integrating an increase in competition (with selection eect)
into our theoretical framework. Understanding the factors aecting the entry and
exit into such activities is certainly a subject for further works and could path the
way for more policy-oriented conclusions aiming at easing the adoption of coping
strategies by the local population following such a refugee inow.
Furthermore, our empirical analysis rejects the hypothesized non-monotonic re-
lationship according to which negative externalities (environmental degradation, se-
curity issues, disease spread, etc) would overcome the economic benets in villages
much more aected by the refugee presence. On the contrary, we found the opposite
relationship : the closer you are or the more populated the refugee camp is, the more
27likely you could benet from positive external eects (even when controlling for the
impact on economic activities). By investigating further this U-shaped relationship
between the refugee presence and the consumption per adult equivalent, we found
that a minimum mass of refugees could be needed for these positive externalities to
materialize. Research is currently undertaken to explore how the provision of local
public goods and the concentration of economic activities around the refugee camps
could explain this scale eect on welfare. Understanding the nature of these ndings
could lead to a radical change of paradigm regarding the impact of refugees on the
local population. Along with minimizing the negative externalities, improving the
capabilities of the local people to cope with such a structural change and eventu-
ally, integrating progressively these refugees into the local economy, the presence of
refugees could actually constitute a unique asset (rather than a burden) to break
down some traps of underdevelopment.
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32Figure 1: UNHCR Regional Spatial Analysis Lab (Nairobi) and eldwork geographic coordinates
Table 1: Descriptive statistics for panel data (village-specic data)
Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
RI 4252 2.970049 24.95085 0 261.4514
RI(Burundi) 4252 2.970049 24.95085 0 261.4514
RI(Rwanda) 4252 2.79e-07 3.11e-06 0 .0000349
RC 4252 .1298213 .3361462 0 1
RI(closest) 4252 2.897639 24.2017 0 253.3578
exp(d 1
v;closest) 4252 .0000304 .0002136 0 .0021113
Population(ref) 4252 7299.906 22951.92 0 120000
RC is a dummy variable indicating whether the community leader has replied positively to
the question \Were there any refugee settlements closed by?"; RI(closest) applied the same
average of the refugee population weighted by an exponential distance function; d
 1
v;closest is
the inverse exponential distance function between each village and the closest refugee camp;
Refugees(closest) is the number of refugees in the closest refugee camp.
33Figure 2: Change in consumption per adult equivalent, by initial poverty groups
Figure 3: A refugee camp is not only a dispersion force (Own calculation based on
KHDS)
34Figure 4: KHDS 2004
35Table 2: Descriptive statistics
Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Cons(PAE, 1991) 2046 217646.7 144837 20007.14 1491798
Cons (PAE, 2004) 2064 306802.9 243458.3 23775.18 2758511
Cons(per cap.,1991) 2040 188035.4 153851.9 14951.97 1256506
Cons(per cap.,2004) 2067 248641.5 247665.9 16969.46 4771619
Cons(PAE,t) 4110 262420 205393.8 20007.14 2758511
log(cons(PAE,t)) 4110 12.27243 .6169704 9.903845 14.8302
Size(1991) 2120 6.898113 3.702479 1 30
Size(2004) 2064 4.768895 2.581935 1 22
Log(land,1991) 2126 11.66682 2.4293 0 17.92384
Log(land,2004) 2126 9.875798 4.652381 0 17.76653
Prop. Lit. (1991) 2126 .5248823 .2479797 0 1
Prop. Lit (2004) 2126 .5695399 .2942705 0 1
Subs.(1991) 2126 .5865475 .4925684 0 1
Subs.(2004) 2126 .7168391 .4506399 0 1
Crop sales(1991) 2126 .3222013 .4674296 0 1
Crop sales(2004) 2126 .0456256 .2087208 0 1
Agri. L(1991) 2126 .2121355 .4089164 0 1
Agri. L(2004) 2126 .0898401 .2860198 0 1
NonAgri.L(1991) 2126 .0277516 .1642991 0 1
NonAgri.L(2004) 2126 .1745061 .3796334 0 1
Business(1991) 2126 .1853246 .388652 0 1
Business(2004) 2126 .2196613 .4141146 0 1
LVST(1991) 2126 .2878645 .4528742 0 1
LVST(2004) 2126 .1444026 .3515802 0 1
Migr(kag) 2126 .173095 .3784184 0 1
Migr(out) 2126 .0733772 .2608161 0 1
Prop.migr.(Kag) 2126 .1398416 .2245621 0 1
Prop.migr.(out) 2126 .0585224 .1480509 0 1
Prop. Migr.(Kag, corrected) 2126 .1031855 .1940602 0 1
Prop. Migr.(out, corrected) 2126 .0435935 .1230459 0 1
Past prop.Migr.(Kag) 2126 .0332681 .0976359 0 .8181818
Past prop.Migr(out) 2126 .1262255 .1920051 0 .9166667
Spillover(out, 2004) 2126 3.786924 4.797376 0 23
Spillover(out, 1991) 2126 14.98542 13.73207 0 53
Spillover(kag, 2004) 2126 11.76999 5.782917 1 32
Spillover(kag, 1991) 2126 2.936971 3.144336 0 13
Activity dummies respectively indicate whether one household generates in a greater propor-
tion than the sample average its income from subsistence agriculture (Subs.), self-employed
agricultural activities (Crop Sales), employed agricultural worker (Agri. L), employed non-
agricultural worker (Nonagri. L) and self-employed business (Business) or livestock (LVST)
activities ; while other variables represent the size of the household (Size), the value of land
transformed in real terms and in per adult equivalent (Land), the proportion of literate people
in the household (Prop. Lit.). Prop. Migr(Kag) and Prop. Migr(out) respectively indicate
the proportion of individuals within the initial household who have migrated outside their
original village or its neighborhood in the region of Kagera (Kag) and outside the region of
Kagera (out). Migr.(out) and Migr.(kag) respectively indicate whether the household head
has migrated outside their original village or its neighborhood in the region of Kagera (Kag)
and outside the region of Kagera (out). Spillovers represent the migration spillovers at the
village level while HH Prop. Migr. (corrected), the number of household members migrating
(excluding the one for which the index is computed).
36Table 3: Household Fixed Eect (excluding split-o households)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
HHFE HHFE HHFE HHFE
split. excl. split. excl. split. excl. split. excl.
RI 0.000217 -0.000185 -0.0120*** -0.0114***
(0.000349) (0.000186) (0.00145) (0.00172)
RI2 4.61e-05*** 4.44e-05***
(5.10e-06) (6.28e-06)
Crop Sales 0.0151 0.00810 0.0108
(0.0520) (0.0533) (0.0427)
NonAgri.L 0.0990 0.0917 0.0893
(0.0584) (0.0599) (0.0788)
Agri. L 0.0970 0.0910 0.114
(0.0942) (0.0922) (0.144)
Business 0.228** 0.236** 0.233**
(0.0741) (0.0721) (0.0850)
LVST 0.00295 0.00486 0.00984
(0.0675) (0.0656) (0.0806)
Crop Sales -5.241*** -5.331*** -5.355***
*RI (0.645) (0.616) (0.482)
NonAgri. 0.00688* 0.0168*** 0.0172***
L*RI (0.00284) (0.00202) (0.00143)
Agri. 0.0125 0.0232** 0.0228**
L*RI (0.00896) (0.00765) (0.00734)
Business -0.00274** -0.00228** -0.00235**
*RI (0.000687) (0.000633) (0.000652)
LVST 0.00195*** 0.00186*** 0.00175***
*RI (0.000201) (0.000207) (0.000364)
Log(land) 0.00477 0.00449 0.00413 0.0115
(0.00744) (0.00737) (0.00717) (0.00577)
Prop.Lit. 0.187 [0.184] 0.179 0.177 0.152 [0.11]
(0.121) (0.125) (0.123) (0.0783)
Size -0.0586** -0.0596** -0.0593** -0.0616**
(0.0195) (0.0194) (0.0194) (0.0177)
t 0.0594 0.0461 0.0542 0.0341
(0.0467) (0.0494) (0.0475) (0.0477)
Cluster D sign.
Constant 12.40*** 12.34*** 12.35*** 11.86***
(0.179) (0.167) (0.167) (0.0677)
Obs. 1537 1537 1537 1537
R2 0.121 0.154 0.161 0.260
F-Test 63.45*** 49.68*** 272.16*** 149.17***
Note: *** p< 0:01, ** p< 0:05, * p< 0:1; Robust standard errors in parentheses and clustered
at the district level (allowing for correlation of errors within districts). Between brackets,
are included the p-value of coecients closed to signicance.
37Table 4: Household Fixed Eect (excl. migrants and incl. split-os)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
HHFE HHFE HHFE HHFE HHFE HHFE HHFE HHFE
(2SLS) (2SLS) (2SLS) (2SLS)
split. incl split. incl. split. incl. split. incl. split. incl. split. incl. split. incl. split. incl.
RI 0.0004 0.0005* -0.0017 -0.0024 0.0005*** 0.0005*** -0.0016 -0.0022
(0.000291) (0.000246) (0.00175) (0.00259) (0.000184) (0.000151) (0.00121) (0.00174)
[0.177] [0.195]
RI2 8.92e-06 1.14e-05 8.25e-06** 1.04e-05*
(5.96e-06) (8.82e-06) (4.18e-06) (6.10e-06)
[0.195]
Crop Sales -0.0352 -0.0362 -0.0329 -0.0322 -0.0326 -0.0254
(0.0533) (0.0527) (0.0579) (0.0366) (0.0364) (0.0421)
NonAgri.L 0.193** 0.192** 0.155* 0.199*** 0.198*** 0.168***
(0.0518) (0.0516) (0.0638) (0.0315) (0.0317) (0.0352)
Agri. L 0.138 0.137 0.130 0.140*** 0.140*** 0.135***
(0.0822) (0.0816) (0.0849) (0.0455) (0.0454) (0.0472)
Business 0.249** 0.250** 0.239** 0.265*** 0.266*** 0.262***
(0.0797) (0.0793) (0.0703) (0.0769) (0.0761) (0.0703)
LVST 0.0149 0.0148 0.0158 0.0156 0.0158 0.0177
(0.0878) (0.0877) (0.0880) (0.0552) (0.0550) (0.0529)
Crop 0.0014* 0.0015* 0.0016** 0.0014** 0.0015** 0.0014**
Sales*RI (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007)
NonAgri. 0.0014*** 0.0014*** 0.0016*** 0.0014*** 0.0015*** 0.0016***
L*RI (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Agri. -0.0018** -0.0018** -0.0019*** -0.0018*** -0.0018*** -0.0019***
L*RI (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Business -0.0025*** -0.0025*** -0.0023*** -0.0026*** -0.0024*** -0.0024***
*RI (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
LVST 0.0008** 0.0008** 0.0008* 0.0009*** 0.0009*** 0.0009**
*RI (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004)
Log(land) -0.005 -0.0019 -0.002 0.0013 -0.0036 -0.001 -0.0012 0.0012
(0.0073) (0.0078) (0.0078) (0.0073) (0.0052) (0.0057) (0.0058) (0.0043)
Prop.Lit. 0.183 0.171 0.170 0.153 0.180*** 0.166** 0.165** 0.148***
(0.109) (0.115) (0.115) (0.0905) (0.0693) (0.0713) (0.0716) (0.0561)
[0.152] [0.197] [0.151]
Size -0.0386 -0.0409* -0.0408* -0.0419* -0.0379*** -0.0405*** -0.0405*** -0.0417***
(0.021) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.012) (0.0114) (0.0114) (0.0104)
[0.120]
Split-o 0.121 0.112[0.189] 0.112[0.189] 0.105 0.135*** 0.115*** 0.114*** 0.107***
(0.0826) (0.0738) (0.0733) (0.0786) (0.0485) (0.0415) (0.0406) (0.0392)
Migr.(Kag) 0.151 0.232* 0.231* 0.0752 0.272 0.336 0.334 0.313
(0.0886) (0.105) (0.105) (0.0913) (0.271) (0.294) (0.295) (0.447)
Prop. 0.330 0.357 0.358 0.358* 0.187 0.383 0.404 0.483
Migr.(out) (0.186) (0.181) (0.180) (0.173) (0.392) (0.388) (0.387) (0.428)
[0.136] [0.106] [0.103]
t 0.0712 0.0301 0.0331 0.0285 0.0298 0.0117 0.0172 0.0286
(0.0479) (0.0582) (0.0566) (0.0696) (0.0681) (0.0740) (0.0756) (0.0446)
Cluster D sign. sign.
Obs. 3803 3803 3803 3803 3674 3674 3674 3674
R2 0.185 0.227 0.227 0.287 0.181 0.224 0.224 0.279
F-Test 201.78*** 4.00*** 3.91*** 18.91*** 53.65*** 7.32** 7.22** 4.80*
Anderson 147.68*** 144.39*** 144.58*** 91.13***
Stock-Yogo 51.09 49.55 49.6 29.86
Hansena 0.167 0.163 9.298
(p-value) (0.68) (0.68) (0.69)
Note: *** p< 0:01, ** p< 0:05, * p< 0:1; Between brackets, are included the p-value of coecients
closed to signicance. Robust standard errors in parentheses and clustered at the district level. a
The overidentication test was obtained by partialling out the household-specic variables. We rst
check that due to the Frisch-Wargh-Lovell theorem, the coecients of the remaining variables are
unaltered. We then correct the covariance matrix to make the overidentication test feasible.
38Table 5: Household Fixed Eect (excl. migrants): First stage regression
1st Stage HHFE HHFE HHFE HHFE HHFE HHFE HHFE HHFE
of table 4 (5) (6) (7) (8) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dep Var Prop. Prop. Prop. Prop. Migr. Migr. Migr. Migr.
Migr.(out) Migr.(out) Migr.(out) Migr.(out) (Kag) (Kag) (Kag) (Kag)
Spill 0.0063*** 0.0063*** 0.0063*** 0.0066*** -0.0016 -0.0019 -0.0019 -0.0009
(out) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0016) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0008)
Spill(Kag) 0.0013 0.0014 0.0014 0.0004 -0.0032 -0.0039 -0.00386 -0.00571**
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0024) (0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0015)
Corr. Prop. 0.0354 0.0362 0.0362 0.0342 0.479*** 0.462*** 0.462*** 0.269**
Migr.(Kag) (0.0466) (0.0453) (0.0454) (0.0461) (0.102) (0.0916) (0.0918) (0.0933)
t -0.0739*** -0.084** -0.083** -0.0695** 0.195*** 0.201*** 0.204*** 0.0995***
(0.0175) (0.0222) (0.0220) (0.0233) (0.0466) (0.0418) (0.0410) (0.0211)
RI -7.12e-05 4.14e-05 -0.0006** -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0016 -0.001*
(4.43e-05) (6.01e-05) (0.000211) (0.000183) (0.000192) (0.000143) (0.000986) (0.000510)
RI2 2.57e-06** 1.11e-06 5.76e-06 3.90e-06*
(7.16e-07) (5.59e-07) (3.46e-06) (1.78e-06)
Crop Sales -0.0209 -0.0212 -0.0201 -0.0260 -0.0266 -0.0195
(0.0237) (0.0237) (0.0239) (0.0140) (0.0143) (0.0210)
NonAgri.L 0.005 0.0048 0.0058 -0.0581 -0.0586 -0.0472**
(0.0165) (0.0163) (0.0135) (0.0506) (0.0504) (0.0137)
Agri. L -0.0185 -0.0187 -0.0191 -0.0210 -0.0216 -0.0089
(0.0133) (0.0132) (0.0131) (0.0186) (0.0191) (0.0302)
Business -0.0016 -0.0013 0.0011 -0.145*** -0.144*** -0.0941***
(0.0111) (0.0109) (0.0124) (0.0148) (0.0150) (0.0083)
LVST -0.0117 -0.0117 -0.007 -0.0027 -0.0027 -0.0028
(0.0234) (0.0234) (0.0237) (0.0244) (0.0244) (0.0156)
Crop Sales 0.001*** 0.0011*** 0.001*** -0.00037* -0.0003 -0.0002
*RI (8.09e-05) (7.87e-05) (7.66e-05) (0.00015) (0.0002) (0.0001)
NonAgri. -0.0005*** -0.0005*** -0.0004*** 0.0004 0.0005* 0.0006**
L*RI (3.27e-05) (3.56e-05) (3.99e-05) (0.00025) (0.0002) (0.0001)
Agri. 1.44e-05 2.19e-05 1.98e-05 -3.89e-05 -2.20e-05 -0.0001
L*RI (6.80e-05) (6.68e-05) (7.22e-05) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002)
Business 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 5.64e-05 0.0001 0.0003***
*RI (0.0001) (9.50e-05) (9.61e-05) (0.0001) (0.0001) (4.56e-05)
LVST -0.0003*** -0.0003*** -0.0003*** -0.0005*** -0.0005*** -0.0003**
*RI (6.98e-05) (7.01e-05) (7.51e-05) (9.18e-05) (9.55e-05) (9.46e-05)
Log(land) 0.001 0.0013 0.0013 0.0011 -0.0085 -0.0087 -0.0088 -0.0006
(0.0011) (0.00098) (0.00099) (0.0009) (0.0087) (0.0077) (0.0077) (0.0026)
Prop.Lit. 0.0077 0.0094 0.0091 0.0086 0.0366 0.0440 0.0434 0.0202
(0.0233) (0.0256) (0.0254) (0.0225) (0.0233) (0.0234) (0.0236) (0.0173)
Size -0.0008 -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0031 -0.0019 -0.0019 -0.0007
(0.0019) (0.002) (0.0019) (0.0021) (0.0037) (0.0042) (0.0042) (0.0032)
Split-o 0.0568*** 0.0560*** 0.0559*** 0.0534*** -0.0657 -0.06 -0.0602 -0.0477**
(0.0122) (0.0120) (0.0121) (0.0130) (0.0348) (0.0311) (0.0313) (0.0184)
Cluster D sign. sign.
Obs. 3879 3879 3879 3879 3879 3879 3879 3879
R2 0.301 0.307 0.307 0.328 0.259 0.293 0.294 0.591
F-Test 178.91*** 18.31*** 23.99*** 25.05*** 109.79*** 101.74*** 104.63*** 222.13***
*** p< 0:01, ** p< 0:05, * p< 0:1; Robust standard errors in parentheses and clustered at
the district level. The variable \Corr. Prop. Migr(Kag)" is the proportion of the initial
household which has migrated within the region of Kagera, corrected to keep it exogenous.
(see table 2)
39Table 6: Altruism Test based on Altonji et al (1992) and Witoelar (2005)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
IHFE IHFE IHFE IHFE IHFE IHFE IHFE IHFE
(2SLS) (2SLS) (2SLS) (2SLS) (2SLS) (2SLS) (2SLS) (2SLS)
IV Witoelar Witoelar Dist Dist Dist Dist Dist Dist
(Road) (Road) (Road) (Road) (Road) (Road)
Split-o incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl.
Migr.(Out) excl. excl. excl. excl. excl. incl. incl. incl.
Dep Var log(cons) log(cons) log(cons) log(cons) log(cons) log(cons) log(cons) log(cons)
Log(netinc) 0.125 0.142 0.517*** 0.585*** 0.610*** 0.536*** 0.583*** 0.603***
(0.0726) (0.0828) (0.0116) (0.0145) (0.0258) (0.0174) (0.0142) (0.0272)
[0.146] [0.146]
t 0.168*** 0.0968*** 0.251*** 0.153** 0.185** 0.316*** 0.166** 0.192*
(0.00926) (0.0159) (0.0495) (0.0414) (0.0519) (0.0756) (0.0633) (0.0797)
RI 0.0003* 0.0004* -1.34e-05 0.0002 0.0004* -1.46e-05 0.0004 0.0005**
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Size -0.0521** -0.0493** -0.0534*** -0.0373** -0.0354** -0.0494** -0.0297** -0.0281*
(0.0152) (0.0143) (0.0119) (0.00953) (0.00982) (0.0144) (0.0113) (0.0124)
Prop.Lit. 0.223*** 0.219** 0.193*** 0.175** 0.177** 0.316*** 0.207** 0.208**
(0.0552) (0.0550) (0.0455) (0.0524) (0.0539) (0.0445) (0.0558) (0.0567)
dumnewhh 0.0850 0.0558 0.0510 0.0423 0.0379
(0.0492) (0.0515) (0.0514) (0.0474) (0.0471)
Prop. Migr. 0.274 0.140 0.146 0.590*** 0.585***
(out)b (0.137) (0.120) (0.120) (0.124) (0.126)
Migr.(Kag) 0.218* 0.352*** 0.363*** 0.346*** 0.354***
(0.0915) (0.0459) (0.0424) (0.0432) (0.0400)
Log(land) -0.0487*** -0.0477*** -0.0499*** -0.0488***





Constant 10.37*** 10.11*** 5.926*** 5.655*** 5.368*** 5.621*** 5.668*** 5.439***
(0.847) (0.948) (0.178) (0.148) (0.294) (0.262) (0.202) (0.352)
IHFE sign. sign. sign. sign. sign. sign. sign. sign.
Obs. 3781 3781 3781 3781 3781 4082 4082 4082
R-squared 0.609 0.621 0.333 0.290 0.248 0.247 0.275 0.241
First Stage
Dep Var log(netinc) log(netinc) log(netinc) log(netinc) log(netinc) log(netinc) log(netinc) log(netinc)
Log(land) 0.0629*** 0.0584*** 0.0680*** 0.0584*** 0.0617*** 0.0521***
(0.009)iv (0.009)iv (0.00811) (0.00860) (0.00629) (0.00603)
Log(Bus) 0.0393*** 0.0395*** 0.0395*** 0.0370***
(0.004)iv (0.004)iv (0.00402) (0.00677)
Log(eqip) 0.0294** 0.0291** 0.0291** 0.0265*
(0.008)iv (0.008)iv (0.00776) (0.0104)
Log(road) -0.266*** -0.135*** -0.619*** -0.679*** -0.651*** -0.663***
(Uganda) (0.032)iv (0.026)iv (0.037)iv (0.023)iv (0.019)iv (0.015)iv
Log(road) -0.627*** -0.444*** -0.794*** -0.969*** -0.975*** -0.834***
(Rwanda) (0.062)iv (0.051)iv (0.052)iv (0.05)iv (0.046)iv (0.043)iv
Obs. 3857 3857 3857 3857 3857 4162 4162 4162
R-squared 0.379 0.388 0.328 0.368 0.388 0.316 0.359 0.376
Note: *** p< 0:01, ** p< 0:05, * p< 0:1; Robust standard errors in parentheses and clustered at the district level.
Columns (1) and (2) use the instruments proposed by Witoelar (2005), i.e. the value of land, farm productive equipments
and non-farm productive assets. Regressions (3) to (8) use the distance to the main economic partners as IV, the distance
by road to Uganda and Rwanda. To make this distinction clear in the rst-stage estimation, iv indicates instrumental
variables that are excluded from the second-stage regression presented in the above part of the table. Regressions (6)
to (8) dier from (1) to (5) as the sample used includes those migrating outside the region of Kagera. Therefore, b
indicates that the variable \Prop. Migr.(out)" is replaced by the direct measure of the decision to move outside the
region of Kagera by the household in the columns (7) and (8).
40Table 7: Household Fixed Eect (incl. migrants and split-os)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
HHFE HHFE HHFE HHFE HHFE HHFE HHFE HHFE
(2SLS) (2SLS) (2SLS) (2SLS)
split. incl. split. incl. split. incl. split. incl. split. incl. split. incl. split. incl. split. incl.
RI 0.0006* 0.0008** -0.0008 -0.002 0.0007*** 0.0009*** -0.0005 -0.0016
(0.0003) (0.00025) (0.0017) (0.0025) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0008) (0.0018)
RI2 6.30e-06 1.03e-05 5.47e-06* 8.45e-06
(5.75e-06) (8.43e-06) (2.93e-06) (6.52e-06)
[0.195]
Crop Sales -0.0535 -0.0542 -0.0463 -0.0512 -0.0519 -0.0413
(0.0521) (0.0517) (0.0625) (0.0342) (0.0342) (0.0424)
NonAgri.L 0.211** 0.210** 0.189** 0.223*** 0.223*** 0.203***
(0.0565) (0.0565) (0.0606) (0.0703) (0.0703) (0.0328)
Agri. L 0.125 0.124 0.124 0.125 0.125 0.128**
(0.0919) (0.0915) (0.0904) (0.0881) (0.0884) (0.0552)
Business 0.237** 0.237** 0.221** 0.256*** 0.256*** 0.248***
(0.0878) (0.0876) (0.0714) (0.0742) (0.0741) (0.0723)
LVST 0.0149 0.0147 0.008 0.0144 0.0142 0.0079
(0.0808) (0.0809) (0.0747) (0.0521) (0.0522) (0.0444)
Crop Sales 0.0017** 0.0018** 0.0019*** 0.0017*** 0.0018*** 0.0019***
*RI (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0003)
NonAgri. 0.00096** 0.00099** 0.0013*** 0.0009 0.00096 0.0013***
L*RI (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0002)
[0.131] [0.119]
Agri. -0.0019** -0.0019** -0.0019*** -0.0019*** -0.0019*** -0.0019***
L*RI (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Business -0.0026*** -0.0025*** -0.0022*** -0.0026*** -0.0025*** -0.0022***
*RI (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
LVST 0.0005 0.0005 0.0006* 0.0006*** 0.0006*** 0.0007***
*RI (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
[0.12] [0.137]
Log(land) -0.0111 -0.007 -0.007 -0.002 -0.009 -0.007 -0.007 -0.002
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.0196) (0.016) (0.016) (0.005)
Prop.Lit. 0.231* 0.211 0.210 0.183* 0.222 0.210 0.210 0.178***
(0.109) (0.109) (0.109) (0.0812) (0.155) (0.133) (0.133) (0.0512)
[0.111] [0.112] [0.151] [0.114] [0.115]
Size -0.0352 -0.0370 -0.0369 -0.0395* -0.0343*** -0.0365*** -0.0365*** -0.0391***
(0.0219) (0.0202) (0.0202) (0.0182) (0.0112) (0.0113) (0.0113) (0.0108)
[0.169] [0.127] [0.127]
Split-o 0.147 0.137 0.136 0.123 0.155*** 0.142*** 0.142*** 0.134***
(0.0874) (0.0783) (0.0781) (0.0767) (0.0508) (0.0426) (0.0423) (0.0463)
[0.154] [0.141] [0.141] [0.170]
Migr.(Kag) 0.147 0.224* 0.224* 0.0847 0.343 0.376 0.374 0.385
(0.0769) (0.100) (0.101) (0.0954) (0.303) (0.310) (0.312) (0.475)
[0.114]
Prop. 0.362** 0.401** 0.400** 1.968*** 0.432 0.362 0.357 0.394*
Migr.(out) (0.115) (0.109) (0.109) (0.219) (1.259) (1.107) (1.114) (0.217)
t 0.0241 -0.0241 -0.0222 -0.0212 -0.0165 -0.0527 -0.0506 -0.0408
(0.0530) (0.0625) (0.0622) (0.0617) (0.0709) (0.0586) (0.0598) (0.0526)
Cluster D sign. sign.
Obs. 4104 4104 4104 4104 3966 3966 3966 3966
R2 0.226 0.264 0.264 0.325 0.218 0.259 0.259 0.315
F-Test 102.67*** 31.05*** 32.10*** 13.20*** 50.74*** 20.16*** 20.15*** 7.53**
Anderson 69.85*** 67.15*** 66.27*** 95.39***
Stock-Yogo 17.68 16.9 16.67 23.32
Hansen 2.036 5.289* 5.328*
(p-value) (0.36) (0.07) (0.07)
Note: *** p< 0:01, ** p< 0:05, * p< 0:1; Between brackets, are included the p-value of
coecients closed to signicance. Robust standard errors in parentheses and clustered at the
district level.
41Table 8: Household Fixed Eect (excl. migrants): Do the eects last overtime?
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
HHFE HHFE HHFE HHFE HHFE HHFE HHFE HHFE
(2SLS) (2SLS) (2SLS) (2SLS)
split. incl. split. incl. split. incl. split. incl. split. incl. split. incl. split. incl. split. incl.
RI(BU) 0.0005 0.0005* -0.0017 -0.0024 0.0005*** 0.0005*** -0.0016 -0.0021
(0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0018) (0.0026) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0012) (0.0017)
[0.192]
RI(BU)2 8.88e-06 1.11e-05 8.31e-06** 1.02e-05*
(6.07e-06) (8.79e-06) (4.20e-06) (6.11e-06)
RI(RW) 1616 1593* 1518* 1776 1279 1687 1695 2859
(1739) (726.8) (699.9) (1193) (1556) (1498) (1501) (2594)
RI(RW)2 dropped dropped dropped dropped
Crop Sales 0.0014* 0.0015* 0.0016** 0.0014* 0.0015** 0.0014**
*RI(BU) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007)
NonAgri. 0.0014*** 0.0014*** 0.0016*** 0.0014*** 0.0015*** 0.0016***
L*RI(BU) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Agri. -0.0019** -0.0018** -0.0019*** -0.00185*** -0.0018*** -0.0019***
L*RI(BU) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Business -0.0025*** -0.0024*** -0.0023*** -0.0026*** -0.0025*** -0.0024***
*RI(BU) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
LVST 0.0008** 0.0008** 0.0008* 0.0009*** 0.0009*** 0.0009**
*RI(BU) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004)
Crop Sales -8927 -8908 -9195 -8252 -8344 -9649**
*RI(RW) (6020) (6014) (5486) (5704) (5761) (4619)
[0.199] [0.155] [0.148] [0.148]
NonAgri. 5589 5617 5898 4975*** 4892*** 5781**
L*RI(RW) (3807) (3806) (4326) (1411) (1400) (2444)
Agri. -16e+06 -16e+06* -10e+06 -16e+06*** -16e+06*** -10e+06***
L*RI(RW) (8.16e+06) (8.18e+06) (6.98e+06) (3.76e+06) (3.79e+06) (3.36e+06)
[0.189]
Business -7099*** -7109*** -7414*** -6660** -6790** -8191***
*RI(RW) (929.2) (931.6) (1175) (3089) (3149) (2668)
LVST 7307** 7306** 8068*** 6613*** 6609*** 6784***
*RI(RW) (2067) (2064) (1607) (2451) (2446) (2586)
Log(land) -0.00499 -0.00197 -0.00207 0.00124 -0.00363 -0.00119 -0.00135 0.00114
(0.00730) (0.00786) (0.00787) (0.00736) (0.00521) (0.00572) (0.00575) (0.00428)
Prop.Lit. 0.184 0.171 0.170 0.154 0.180*** 0.166** 0.165** 0.149***
(0.109) (0.116) (0.116) (0.0908) (0.0694) (0.0718) (0.0722) (0.0562)
Size -0.039 -0.041* -0.041* -0.042* -0.038*** -0.041*** -0.04*** -0.04***
(0.0206) (0.0192) (0.0192) (0.0181) (0.0124) (0.0114) (0.0114) (0.0104)
Split-o 0.122 0.112 0.111 0.104 0.135*** 0.114*** 0.112*** 0.106***
(0.0830) (0.0738) (0.0733) (0.0784) (0.0485) (0.0410) (0.0401) (0.0391)
Migr.(Kag) 0.151 0.229* 0.228* 0.0743 0.270 0.324 0.322 0.303
(0.0888) (0.106) (0.107) (0.0924) (0.273) (0.301) (0.302) (0.454)
Prop. 0.331 0.362* 0.363* 0.361* 0.190 0.394 0.415 0.486
Migr.(out) (0.185) (0.178) (0.177) (0.172) (0.395) (0.390) (0.390) (0.430)
t 0.0702 0.0325 0.0355 0.0303 0.0296 0.0168 0.0223 0.0308
(0.0499) (0.0562) (0.0548) (0.0689) (0.0676) (0.0743) (0.0763) (0.0446)
Cluster D sign. sign.
Obs. 3803 3803 3803 3803 3674 3674 3674 3674
R2 0.185 0.228 0.228 0.288 0.181 0.226 0.226 0.280
F-Test 434.45*** 16227.20*** 28238.60*** 106.68*** 24.80*** 245.58*** 190.63*** 110.57***
RI(BU) represents the RI index, restricted to the refugees from Burundi while RI(RW) cor-
responds to the RI index restricted to the refugee camps, populated of refugees from Rwanda.
*** p< 0:01, ** p< 0:05, * p< 0:1; Between brackets, are included the p-value of coecients
closed to signicance. Robust standard errors in parentheses and clustered at the district
level. The activity variables are not presented but give similar results than previous tables.
42Table 9: Choice of location for refugee camps?
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
PART A
Sample All All All All All All All All
RI RI2 RI(closest) RI(closest)2 Space Space2 Scale Scale2
Crop Sales -4.709 -1362 -4.545 -1278 -3.24e-05 -8.46e-08 -240.2 -1.85e+08
(1991) (5.216) -1491 (5.038) -1399 (3.71e-05) (9.30e-08) -3391 (3.81e+08)
NonAgri.L 1.264 253.1 1.236 238.5 1.38e-05 2.03e-08 -1317 -1.36e+08
(1991) (1.905) (436.2) (1.855) (410.3) (1.85e-05) (3.16e-08) -3229 (3.02e+08)
Agri. L 0.462 -170.4 0.487 -157.4 1.66e-05 5.05e-11 1935 1.63e+08
(1991) (1.200) (433.5) (1.164) (405.3) (1.63e-05) (2.20e-08) -3816 (3.01e+08)
Business -4.862 -1111 -4.733 -1045 -4.63e-05 -7.87e-08 -2397 -3.56e+08
(1991) (5.544) (1271) (5.397) (1195) (5.27e-05) (8.98e-08) (5601) (5.46e+08)
LVST 5.983 1369 5.824 1287 5.71e-05 9.78e-08 11493 9.72e+08
(1991) (5.405) (1244) (5.261) (1170) (5.13e-05) (8.87e-08) (5770) (5.65e+08)
Log(land) -0.431 -121.3 -0.417 -113.9 -3.11e-06 -7.70e-09 -719.1 -35.39e+06
(1991) (0.582) (156.1) (0.563) (146.5) (4.62e-06) (1.01e-08) (600.1) (2.27e+07)
Prop.Lit. -10.10 -2144 -9.856 -2018 -0.000104 -1.60e-07 -20187* -14.63e+08*
(1991) (9.147) -1924 (8.928) -1811 (9.48e-05) (1.44e-07) -9167 (6.59e+08)
Size 0.0967 49.26 0.0905 46.05 -2.81e-07 2.30e-09 -126.1 -17.77e+06
(1991) (0.207) (74.76) (0.198) (70.01) (1.05e-06) (4.07e-09) (455.2) (3.39e+07)
Prop. (1991) -1.794 -469.6 -1.737 -439.6 -1.36e-05 -2.49e-08 10430 5.54e+08
Migr.(out) (3.875) (928.8) (3.765) (871.8) (3.47e-05) (5.96e-08) -9742 (5.58e+08)
Log(ConsPAE) -8.301 -1815 -8.091 -1707 -8.25e-05 -1.30e-07 -10719 -9.59e+08
(1991) (7.318) (1610) (7.132) (1514) (7.23e-05) (1.15e-07) (6729) (6.66e+08)
Constant 117.3 25866 114.3 24327 0.00116 1.85e-06 160085 1.39e+10
(1991) (105.7) -23480 (103.0) -22081 (0.00104) (1.67e-06) -95963 (9.37e+09)
Observations 1888 1888 1888 1888 1888 1888 1888 1888
R-squared 0.041 0.032 0.042 0.032 0.053 0.037 0.114 0.069
PART B
Sample Karagwe Karagwe Karagwe Karagwe Karagwe Karagwe Karagwe Karagwe
Ngara Ngara Ngara Ngara Ngara Ngara Ngara Ngara
RI RI2 RI(closest) RI(closest)2 Space Space2 Scale Scale2
Crop Sales -26.09 -7302 -25.21 -6852 -0.000190 -4.57e-07 -17997 -22.25e+08
(1991) (14.81) -4754 (14.23) -4456 (8.09e-05) (2.76e-07) -4903 (8.81e+08)
Non Agri.L -5.308 -1216 -5.169 -1144 -5.07e-05 -8.84e-08 -13611* -16.92e+08
(1991) (4.227) (881.8) (4.127) (830.7) (4.48e-05) (6.92e-08) -1847 (4.95e+08)
Agri. L -6.870 -3263 -6.458 -3051 9.37e-06 -1.56e-07 12577 8.27e+08
(1991) (9.923) -3499 (9.492) -3278 (4.01e-05) (1.93e-07) -3159 (7.24e+08)
Business -25.38 -5960 -24.68 -5602 -0.000234 -4.12e-07 -2656 -50.67e+06
(1991) (33.01) -7701 (32.11) -7240 (0.000307) (5.37e-07) -3078 (2.16e+07)
LVST 7.504 2096 7.256 1968 5.53e-05 1.36e-07 -53.15 1.58e+08
(1991) (12.13) -2963 (11.78) -2785 (0.000108) (2.06e-07) -7089 (8.40e+08)
Log(land) -3.992 -1062 -3.866 -997.5 -3.16e-05 -6.96e-08 301.6 -3.51e+06
(1991) (7.424) -1859 (7.206) -1747 (6.38e-05) (1.26e-07) -1984 (2.36e+08)
Prop.Lit. -20.73 -3786 -20.32 -3571 -0.000240 -3.15e-07 -10989 -6.65e+08
(1991) (10.58) -1339 (10.45) -1272 (0.000149) (1.49e-07) -2159 (2.52e+08)
Size 0.863 375.7 0.816 351.6 3.44e-07 1.90e-08 -2414 -2.005e+08**
(1991) (2.038) (627.7) (1.962) (588.7) (1.23e-05) (3.75e-08) (544.6) (6.53e+06)
Prop. (1991) -13.44 -4313 -12.90 -4035 -6.77e-05 -2.14e-07 17414 1.98e+09
Migr.(out) (22.87) -5281 (22.24) -4957 (0.000210) (3.37e-07) -17753 (1.43e+09)
Log(ConsPAE) -18.63 -4157 -18.15 -3908 -0.000181 -2.92e-07 -18832*** -17.76e+08*
(1991) (7.244) -1811 (7.028) -1700 (6.10e-05) (1.14e-07) (248.5) (1.62e+08)
Constant 312.9 70798 304.6 66562 0.00300 4.96e-06 289739 2.77e+10*
(191.3) -46337 (185.9) -43528 (0.00170) (3.09e-06) -57175 (4.20e+09)
Observations 475 475 475 475 475 475 475 475
R-squared 0.110 0.094 0.110 0.094 0.132 0.102 0.178 0.119
Note: *** p< 0:01, ** p< 0:05, * p< 0:1; Robust standard errors in parentheses and clustered
at the district level.
43Table 10: Household Fixed Eect (excl. migrants) with alternative treatment vari-
ables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
HHFE HHFE HHFE HHFE HHFE HHFE
(2SLS) (2SLS) (2SLS) (2SLS) (2SLS) (2SLS)
Treat RC RC RC RI(closest) RI(closest) RI(closest)
split. incl. split. incl. split. incl. split. incl. split. incl. split. incl.
Treat -0.0161 0.000133 -0.0261 0.000533*** -0.00158 -0.00222




Crop Sales -0.0473 -0.0406 -0.0326 -0.0254
(0.0397) (0.0447) (0.0364) (0.0421)
NonAgri.L 0.218*** 0.189*** 0.198*** 0.168***
(0.0299) (0.0384) (0.0317) (0.0351)
Agri. L 0.151*** 0.146*** 0.140*** 0.135***
(0.0390) (0.0407) (0.0454) (0.0473)
Business 0.273*** 0.271*** 0.266*** 0.263***
(0.0795) (0.0739) (0.0761) (0.0703)
LVST 0.0215 0.0244 0.0158 0.0177
(0.0574) (0.0544) (0.0550) (0.0529)
Crop Sales 0.181** 0.184*** 0.00153** 0.00150**
*Treat (0.0725) (0.0455) (0.000718) (0.000728)
NonAgri. -0.0770 -0.0849* 0.00151*** 0.00169***
L*Treat (0.0498) (0.0448) (0.000149) (0.000125)
Agri. -0.141 -0.149 -0.00184*** -0.00194***
L*Treat (0.0975) (0.102) (0.000292) (0.000304)
[0.148] [0.147]
Business -0.0971 -0.0790 -0.00257*** -0.00252***
*Treat (0.0997) (0.0733) (0.000325) (0.000343)
LVST -0.0454 -0.0437 0.000894*** 0.000944**
*Treat (0.0849) (0.0790) (0.000298) (0.000378)
Log(land) -0.00362 -0.00123 0.00113 -0.00361 -0.00122 0.00122
(0.00520) (0.00573) (0.00444) (0.00522) (0.00576) (0.00428)
Prop.Lit. 0.179** 0.165** 0.145*** 0.180*** 0.165** 0.148***
(0.0703) (0.0697) (0.0549) (0.0693) (0.0716) (0.0562)
Size -0.0380*** -0.0408*** -0.0419*** -0.0379*** -0.0405*** -0.0417***
(0.0123) (0.0113) (0.0103) (0.0124) (0.0114) (0.0104)
Split-o 0.135*** 0.116*** 0.110*** 0.135*** 0.114*** 0.107***
(0.0486) (0.0385) (0.0373) (0.0485) (0.0406) (0.0392)
Migr.(Kag) 0.206 0.385 0.476 0.187 0.404 0.483
(0.381) (0.377) (0.411) (0.392) (0.387) (0.428)
Prop. 0.263 0.319 0.317 0.272 0.334 0.313
Migr.(out) (0.269) (0.295) (0.427) (0.271) (0.295) (0.447)
t 0.0406 0.0215 0.0374 0.0298 0.0172 0.0286
(0.0634) (0.0772) (0.0472) (0.0681) (0.0756) (0.0446)
Cluster D sign. sign.
Obs. 3674 3674 3674 3674 3674 3674
R2 0.181 0.225 0.278 0.181 0.224 0.278
F-Test 3.66* 1.42 4.17* 53.65*** 7.20** 4.79*
*** p< 0:01, ** p< 0:05, * p< 0:1; Between brackets, are included the p-value of coecients
closed to signicance. Robust standard errors in parentheses and clustered at the district level.
RC is a dummy variable indicating whether the community leader has replied positively to
the question \Were there any refugee settlement closed by?". RI(Closest) is similar to the
RI index but restricted to the closest refugee camp.
44Table 11: Household Fixed Eect (excl. migrants) with alternative treatment vari-
ables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
HHFE HHFE HHFE HHFE HHFE HHFE
(2SLS) (2SLS) (2SLS) (2SLS) (2SLS) (2SLS)
Treat Space Space Space Scale Scale Scale
Treat 53.72** -120.1 -161.5 -1.20e-06 -5.41e-06*** -5.04e-06***
(25.85) (83.68) (118.9) (9.72e-07) (1.76e-06) (1.87e-06)
[0.151] [0.174]
Treat2 85469*** 101389** 4.17e-11*** 4.09e-11**
-32287 -47077 ( 1.55e-11) ( 1.65e-11 )
Crop Sales -0.0329 -0.0256 -0.0362 -0.0302
(0.0364) (0.0421) (0.0305) (0.0353)
NonAgri.L 0.196*** 0.166*** 0.189*** 0.162***
(0.0316) (0.0351) (0.0312) (0.0343)
Agri. L 0.139*** 0.133*** 0.153*** 0.147***
(0.0457) (0.0475) (0.0371) (0.0390)
Business 0.268*** 0.265*** 0.266*** 0.262***
(0.0760) (0.0700) (0.0712) (0.0663)
LVST 0.0150 0.0166 0.000562 0.00604
(0.0555) (0.0535) (0.0564) (0.0570)
Crop Sales 180.2*** 174.5*** 2.09e-06** 2.45e-06***
*Treat (68.28) (67.34) (8.84e-07) (6.33e-07)
NonAgri. 202.3*** 226.6*** 5.46e-07 5.66e-07
L*Treat (18.76) (25.95) (6.76e-07) (4.31e-07)
[0.190]
Agri. -134.7*** -144.3*** -2.87e-06* -3.22e-06
L*Treat (38.22) (41.62) (1.48e-06) (2.05e-06)
[0.116]
Business -286.9*** -280.8*** -1.90e-06*** -1.84e-06***
*Treat (39.43) (41.09) (5.26e-07) (4.16e-07)
LVST 103.4*** 111.8** 1.15e-06* 9.63e-07
*Treat (37.28) (48.21) (6.52e-07) (7.24e-07)
[0.183]
Log(land) -0.00356 -0.00119 0.00123 -0.00384 -0.00198 0.000674
(0.00525) (0.00577) (0.00429) (0.00506) (0.00535) (0.00432)
Prop.Lit. 0.180*** 0.163** 0.146** 0.177** 0.166** 0.147**
(0.0694) (0.0720) (0.0570) (0.0700) (0.0747) (0.0588)
Size -0.0379*** -0.0404*** -0.0416*** -0.0379*** -0.0403*** -0.0418***
(0.0124) (0.0114) (0.0104) (0.0124) (0.0114) (0.0102)
Split-o 0.135*** 0.113*** 0.107*** 0.132*** 0.112*** 0.102***
(0.0485) (0.0405) (0.0388) (0.0466) (0.0383) (0.0367)
Migr.(Kag) 0.185 0.404 0.481 0.244 0.390 0.457
(0.392) (0.388) (0.428) (0.395) (0.345) (0.367)
Prop. 0.273 0.337 0.322 0.258 0.291 0.244
Migr.(out) (0.272) (0.294) (0.442) (0.266) (0.277) (0.361)
t 0.0291 0.0166 0.0281 0.0604 0.0580 0.0631
(0.0685) (0.0758) (0.0449) (0.0655) (0.0779) (0.0508)
Cluster D sign. sign.
Obs. 3674 3674 3674 3674 3674 3674
R2 0.180 0.224 0.278 0.184 0.231 0.286
F-Test 21.89*** 598.96*** 37.92*** 164.74*** 4.81* 5.72**
*** p< 0:01, ** p< 0:05, * p< 0:1; Between brackets, are included the p-value of coecients
closed to signicance. Robust standard errors in parentheses and clustered at the district
level. Space represents the spatial dimension of the RI(closest) index, i.e exp(dv;closest)
 1
while scale is computed as the number of refugees in the closest refugee camp.
45Table 12: Household Fixed Eect (excl. migrants): scale or space
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
HHFE HHFE HHFE HHFE HHFE HHFE HHFE HHFE
(2SLS) (2SLS) (2SLS) (2SLS)
split.incl. split.incl. split.incl. split.incl. split.incl. split.incl. split.incl. split.incl.
Scale -2.15e-06 -1.76e-06 -6.79e-06*** -6.09e-06** -2.15e-06* -1.79e-06*** -6.53e-06*** -5.84e-06***
(1.91e-06) (9.74e-07) (1.53e-06) (2.22e-06) (1.16e-06) (6.72e-07) (9.58e-07) (1.41e-06)
[0.131]
Scale2 4.83e-11 ** 4.22e-11* 4.53e-11 *** 4.03e-11***
( 1.33e-11) (1.97e-11) (7.66e-12 ) ( 1.23e-11)
Space 163.2 137.0* 350.9*** 277.5 171.7** 141.2*** 350.8*** 272.8**
(111.0) (55.65) (67.34) (163.7) (76.70) (45.74) (71.57) (138.1)
[0.151]
Space2 -121396** -86548 -117232*** -85928
(45137) (93479) (29115) (71196)
Crop Sales 2.25e-06** 2.14e-06** 2.23e-06*** 2.55e-06*** 2.41e-06*** 2.60e-06***
*Scale (6.28e-07) (6.61e-07) (4.93e-07) (8.73e-07) (8.71e-07) (5.50e-07)
NonAgri. 1.50e-07 -1.16e-07 -4.59e-07 1.87e-07 -3.25e-08 -4.20e-07
L*Scale (1.07e-06) (1.26e-06) (8.62e-07) (6.24e-07) (7.09e-07) (6.29e-07)
Agri. -4.23e-06 -3.84e-06 -4.39e-06 -4.10e-06 -3.71e-06 -4.24e-06
L*Scale (4.36e-06) (4.04e-06) (6.03e-06) (2.56e-06) (2.41e-06) (3.45e-06)
[0.109] [0.123]
Business -9.87e-07 -6.99e-07 -4.59e-07 -8.23e-07 -5.34e-07 -4.37e-07
*Scale (1.25e-06) (1.00e-06) (1.41e-06) (7.81e-07) (6.94e-07) (8.62e-07)
LVST -1.53e-07 2.40e-07 6.96e-09 -1.99e-07 1.89e-07 -1.06e-07
*Scale (1.23e-06) (1.14e-06) (1.26e-06) (7.21e-07) (6.56e-07) (6.48e-07)
Crop Sales 20.04 37.17 32.11 -0.0923 22.50 5.543
*Space (56.92) (64.62) (51.87) (74.55) (71.86) (73.54)
NonAgri. 201.2** 223.1** 281.9*** 196.1*** 213.0*** 269.2***
L*Space (73.76) (85.25) (56.62) (38.28) (44.84) (45.21)
Agri. 116.0 94.45 123.6 109.2 87.92 116.9
L*Space (283.4) (262.0) (380.0) (168.3) (158.0) (220.8)
Business -232.8** -236.0*** -243.2** -245.3*** -249.6*** -251.0***
*Space (65.62) (41.78) (65.45) (41.70) (39.85) (37.36)
LVST 105.6** 80.30** 98.36** 117.8*** 90.20*** 115.2***
*Space (38.16) (29.84) (30.47) (35.22) (25.11) (33.05)
Log(land) -0.005 -0.002 -0.0026 0.0007 -0.0039 -0.0014 -0.0016 0.0008
(0.0072) (0.0078) (0.0076) (0.0074) (0.005) (0.0055) (0.005) (0.004)
Prop.Lit. 0.180 0.164 0.169 0.148 0.175** 0.159** 0.164** 0.144**
(0.111) (0.120) (0.121) (0.0956) (0.0707) (0.0748) (0.0751) (0.0593)
Size -0.038 -0.041* -0.041* -0.042* -0.038*** -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.042***
(0.021) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.01)
Split-o 0.120 0.107 0.110 0.0973 0.133*** 0.109*** 0.114*** 0.101***
(0.081) (0.07) (0.072) (0.074) (0.047) (0.038) (0.039) (0.036)
Migr.(Kag) 0.150 0.229* 0.221* 0.0688 0.279 0.330 0.319 0.244
(0.0823) (0.0961) (0.0946) (0.0828) (0.268) (0.277) (0.273) (0.345)
Prop. 0.326 0.356* 0.345 0.347* 0.197 0.386 0.327 0.404
Migr.(out) (0.180) (0.174) (0.173) (0.162) (0.378) (0.354) (0.332) (0.352)
t 0.0962** 0.0585 0.0696 0.0659 0.0546 0.0409 0.0461 0.0600
(0.0324) (0.0409) (0.0366) (0.0592) (0.0662) (0.0742) (0.0779) (0.0505)
Cluster D sign. sign.
Obs. 3803 3803 3803 3803 3674 3674 3674 3674
R2 0.190 0.234 0.236 0.294 0.185 0.231 0.234 0.290
F-Test 5.20*** 150.54*** 133.73*** 176.57*** 53.41*** 53.41*** 15.99*** 31.45***
*** p< 0:01, ** p< 0:05, * p< 0:1; Between brackets, are included the p-value of coecients
closed to signicance. Robust standard errors in parentheses and clustered at the district






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































CORE Discussion Papers 
 
2008/80.  Jean GABSZEWICZ, Salome GVETADZE, Didier LAUSSEL and Patrice PIERETTI. Pubic 
goods' attractiveness and migrations. 
2008/81.  Karen CRABBE and Hylke VANDENBUSSCHE. Are your firm's taxes set in Warsaw? Spatial 
tax competition in Europe. 
2008/82.  Jean-Sébastien  TANCREZ,  Benoît  ROLAND,  Jean-Philippe  CORDIER  and  Fouad  RIANE. 
How stochasticity and emergencies disrupt the surgical schedule. 
2008/83.  Peter RICHTÁRIK. Approximate level method. 
2008/84.  Çağatay  KAYI  and  Eve  RAMAEKERS.  Characterizations  of  Pareto-efficient,  fair,  and 
strategy-proof allocation rules in queueing problems. 
2009/1.  Carlo ROSA. Forecasting the direction of policy rate changes: The importance of ECB words. 
2009/2.  Sébastien  LAURENT,  Jeroen  V.K.  ROMBOUTS  and  Francesco  VIOLANTE.  Consistent 
ranking of multivariate volatility models. 
2009/3.  Dunia LÓPEZ-PINTADO and Juan D. MORENO-TERNERO. The principal's dilemma. 
2009/4.  Jacek B. KRAWCZYK and Oana-Silvia SEREA. A viability theory approach to a two-stage 
optimal control problem of technology adoption. 
2009/5.  Jean-François MERTENS and Anna RUBINCHIK. Regularity and stability of equilibria in an 
overlapping generations model with exogenous growth. 
2009/6.  Nicolas GILLIS and François GLINEUR. Using underapproximations for sparse nonnegative 
matrix factorization. 
2009/7.  Michel  M.  DENUIT,  Louis  EECKHOUDT  and  Mario  MENEGATTI.  Correlated  risks, 
bivariate utility and optimal choices. 
2009/8.  Michel  M.  DENUIT,  Louis  EECKHOUDT  and  Mario  MENEGATTI.  Adding  independent 
risks in an insurance portfolio: which shape for the insurers' preferences? 
2009/9.  Antoine BOMMIER and Stéphane ZUBER. The Pareto principle of optimal inequality. 
2009/10.  Raouf  BOUCEKKINE,  Jacek  B.  KRAWCZYK  and  Thomas  VALLEE.  Environmental 
negotiations as dynamic games: Why so selfish? 
2009/11.  Théophile T. AZOMAHOU, Raouf BOUCEKKINE and Phu NGUYEN-VAN. Promoting clean 
technologies under imperfect competition. 
2009/12.  Patrice PIERETTI and Skerdilajda ZANAJ. On tax competition, public goods provision and 
jurisdictions' size. 
2009/13.  Jeroen V.K. ROMBOUTS and Lars STENTOFT. Bayesian option pricing using mixed normal 
heteroskedasticity models. 
2009/14.  Gauthier de MAERE d'AERTRYCKE and Yves SMEERS. The valuation of power futures 
based on optimal dispatch. 
2009/15.  Thierry BRECHET, Tsvetomir TSACHEV and Vladimir M. VELIOV. Prices versus quantities 
in a vintage capital model. 
2009/16.  François VANDERBECK and Laurence A. WOLSEY. Reformulation and decomposition of 
integer programs. 
2009/17.  Marc FLEURBAEY, Erik SCHOKKAERT and Koen DECANCQ. What good is happiness? 
2009/18.  David  DE  LA  CROIX  and  Michel  LUBRANO.  The  tradeoff  between  growth  and 
redistribution: ELIE in an overlapping generations model. 
2009/19.  Thierry  BRECHET  and  Fabien  PRIEUR. C an  education  be  good  for  both  growth  and  the 
environment? 
2009/20.  Giacomo SBRANA and Andrea SILVESTRINI. What do we know about comparing aggregate 
and disaggregate forecasts? 
2009/21.  Marc  GERMAIN,  Henry  TULKENS  and  Alphonse  MAGNUS.  Dynamic  core-theoretic 
cooperation in a two-dimensional international environmental model. 
2009/22.  Claude D'ASPREMONT and Rodolphe DOS SANTOS FERREIRA. Household behavior and 
individual autonomy. 
2009/23.  Helmuth  CREMER,  Philippe  DE  DONDER  and  Pierre  PESTIEAU.  Education  and  social 
mobility. Recent titles 
CORE Discussion Papers - continued 
 
2009/24.  Maria Eugenia SANIN and Francesco VIOLANTE. Understanding volatility dynamics in the 
EU-ETS market: lessons from the future. 
2009/25.  Marco DI SUMMA and Laurence A. WOLSEY. Lot-sizing with stock upper bounds and fixed 
charges. 
2009/26.  Johanna M.M. GOERTZ and François MANIQUET. On the informational efficiency of simple 
scoring rules. 
2009/27.  Jean  GABSZEWICZ,  Ornella  TAROLA  and  Skerdilajda  ZANAJ.  On  uncertainty  when  it 
affects successive markets. 
2009/28.  Jerzy  A.  FILAR,  Jacek  B.  KRAWCZYK  and  Manju  AGRAWAL.  On  production  and 
abatement time scales in sustainable development. Can we loosen the sustainability screw ? 
2009/29.  María Eugenia SANIN and Skerdilajda ZANAJ. Clean technology adoption and its influence on 
tradeable emission permit prices. 
2009/30.  Antoine BOMMIER, Marie-Louise LEROUX and Jean-Marie LOZACHMEUR. On the public 
economics of annuities with differential mortality. 
2009/31.  Gilles GRANDJEAN, Ana MAULEON and Vincent VANNETELBOSCH. Connections among 
farsighted agents. 
2009/32.  Axel GAUTIER and Xavier WAUTHY. On the nature of price competition under universal 
service obligations: a note. 
2009/33.  Santanu S. DEY and Laurence A. WOLSEY. Constrained infinite group relaxations of MIPs. 





H. TULKENS (ed.) (2006), Public goods, environmental externalities and fiscal competition. New York, 
Springer-Verlag. 
V.  GINSBURGH  and  D.  THROSBY  (eds.)  (2006),  Handbook  of  the  economics  of  art  and  culture. 
Amsterdam, Elsevier. 
J. GABSZEWICZ (ed.) (2006), La différenciation des produits. Paris, La découverte. 
L. BAUWENS, W. POHLMEIER and D. VEREDAS (eds.) (2008), High frequency financial econometrics: 
recent developments. Heidelberg, Physica-Verlag. 
P. VAN HENTENRYCKE and L. WOLSEY (eds.) (2007), Integration of AI and OR techniques in constraint 
programming for combinatorial optimization problems. Berlin, Springer. 
P-P.  COMBES,  Th.  MAYER  and  J-F.  THISSE  (eds.)  (2008),  Economic  geography:  the  integration  of 
regions and nations. Princeton, Princeton University Press. 
J. HINDRIKS (ed.) (2008), Au-delà de Copernic: de la confusion au consensus ? Brussels, Academic and 
Scientific Publishers. 
 
CORE Lecture Series 
 
C. GOURIÉROUX and A. MONFORT (1995), Simulation Based Econometric Methods. 
A. RUBINSTEIN (1996), Lectures on Modeling Bounded Rationality. 
J. RENEGAR (1999), A Mathematical View of Interior-Point Methods in Convex Optimization. 
B.D.  BERNHEIM  and  M.D.  WHINSTON  (1999),  Anticompetitive  Exclusion  and  Foreclosure  Through 
Vertical Agreements. 
D.  BIENSTOCK  (2001),  Potential  function  methods  for  approximately  solving  linear  programming 
problems: theory and practice. 
R. AMIR (2002), Supermodularity and complementarity in economics. 
R. WEISMANTEL (2006), Lectures on mixed nonlinear programming. 